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GENERAL IITTRODUCTION 
You can build two utterly different kinds of eclectic système. 
One of these wrenches a piece from biochemistry, and tries to 
wedge it, so to speak, between a repression and a reaction for-
mation; another tries to drive three conditioned responses and 
a socially defined value conflict between two phenomenalist 
experiences. This kind of eclecticism is made of pieces that 
won't fit; nonviable grafts, essentially foreign bodies. But the 
kind of eclectism that consists of using different glasses, is 
one which can use, all the . . . . languages . . . . 
We may strive to see the process of repression in phenomenalist 
terms, in physiologic terms, as for example, conditioned response 
terms, or as aspects of imbalanced Gestalten, or in terms of 
sociocultural conflict or all of these together. Sometimes only 
one of our . . . systems has clearly seen an issue; often two 
or three have seen and struggled with it; occasionally all . . . 
have had something vital te say. 
Dr. Mohr, according to Dr. Murphy (i960). 
If we view an important businessman sitting in 
a multiOrganization conference we might see and 
Ъе ahle to say that he is very attentive to the 
ongoing procedure because of his personal inte­
rests. Let us say that one of the individuals 
competitive to his aim has just given him a 
sheath of papers saying that these are the re­
sults of the study done on their respective 
points of view. île might he ahle to notice that 
our businessman is now attentive to the point 
of tenseness. Here is evidence that v/ill help 
or hinder his aims and he must be alert to how 
he uses it. He directs his gaze upon the first 
page and the resulting blur that he perceives 
informs him of his need for his glasses which 
he suddenly remembers he has forgotten. Now, 
with a somewhat perturbed voice he asks for his 
competitor's glasses. He finds that he can 
decipher but a few words through these strange 
lenses. In the following moment he is asked to 
give his conclusions and recommendations as to 
which point of view he now prefers, after 
reading the results of the study. Need we be 
surprised to find that this honest and upright 
gentleman has interpreted the few words of the 
study that he could decipher through his compe-
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tor's glasses to be in favor of his own point of 
view. 
In the behavior instance just elaborated we 
might say that we saw a behavior excerpt charac-
teristic of this particular individual and that 
although it occurred in a socially determined 
situation his behavior was representative of 
his own inner pattern of needs and bodily dis-
positions. From another level we may also note 
a reciprocity between a unique inner organiza-
tion and a unique personal environment. Thus on 
this level the individual is seen as unique 
through his particular capacity for interaction 
with his environment, which has developed through 
the interaction of particular field properties 
of his environment on his potentiel to relate to 
his environment which would have brought forth 
different reaction potentials in any other 
organism. As Gardner Murphy has further noted: 
The organism does not adapt itself to the environment; the 
environment adapts the organism to itself. The kind of thing 
that man is, and the kinds of things that individual men are, 
are both products of a "necessity" - a physical, spatial, 
dynamic necessity O i W i P· 42). 
The individual observed in our behavior excerpt 
came into the world of the conference room as 
an individual with preformed tensions, expectan-
cies and potentialities for response. He was 
attentive to the proceedings and when asked to 
read a significant report to his interests he 
found that, with borrowed glasses, he was only 
able to decipher a few words. His articulation 
of what he had seen was such that he assumed 
the report to be favorable to his view point. 
His purpose in coming to this conference was to 
preserve and if possible advance his view so 
that we might assume that he was very happy to 
gain support from the report he read. Y/hat, 
however, if the report was entirely negative to 
his view point and his poor vision prevented 
him from seeing this. Or is it possible that 
because of his emotional tone he gave value to 
each impression which substantiated his view 
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and ignored other impressions, finding positive 
words readable and negative words blurred. There 
is a great deal of research which would support 
the latter view. 
The real purpose for seeking in the world around 
us is to gain enough information from our en-
vironment so that we might carry out the proper 
actions to satisfy our needs. Xle receive infor-
mation in the form of stimulation upon our 
various sensory receptors. The structuring of 
this stimulation is called perception and as 
Solley and Murphy further state; "Our percep-
tions coordinate our actions with our environ-
ment so that we can succesfully meet our needs". 
(i960, p. 27). We can also note that our organic 
structuration, needs, tensions, expectations, 
and the strength of sensory information play a 
role in structuring our perception so that our 
percepts if structured in line with our needs 
or wishes will reduce them axià be pleasing in 
themselves, although they do not necessarily 
correspond to reality. This condition or state 
has been defined by many writers as autistic 
perception, and. is usually seen to occur under 
conditions of extreme emotion which cannot be 
delayed and under environmental conditions which 
do not provide enough sensory information. This 
type of perception is common in psychosis, the 
very early stages of child development, dreams, 
superstition, and poetry. It can be very grati-
fying but as has been seen it can be doubted 
that the businessman portrayed in the exerpt 
experienced much gratification after he learned 
that the strength of his wishes combined with 
poor sensory information had caused him to form 
an inaccurate perception, which might have 
damaged his chances for presenting his views. 
We can be fairly sure that when he gained more 
information he was able to more realistically 
orientate his views. When the individual cannot 
freely switch from an autistic perception of 
his world to a more realistic orientation then 
pathology is said to be present. 
We can now see that perception is a process 
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which involves the structuring of information 
for the purpose of analyzing means to a goal. 
The perceptual act begins with the individual in 
a tension or need state and the structuring im-
posed develops from a "blur" stage to a stage of 
differentiation and finally to a stage of inte-
gration or articulation of the differentiated 
parts. These are precisely the same stages fol-
lowed by an adult in a novel situation and by a 
child in the process of maturation and motor 
learning. It seems not only that each adult mind 
operates all the time at all three levels but 
that each individual has his own balance of the 
three. We must also note that perceptual orga-
nization is not exclusively dependent or molded 
on need and stimulus patters for we can already 
discover organizational and behavior disposi-
tions and receptor preferences in the newborn. 
This similarity in analysis of problems is sim-
ply the expression of logical ordering flowing fr 
from a general principle of development. We see 
then that a general principle of ordering holds 
from the first diffuse perceptual responses of 
the newborn which mirrors his massive, blurred, 
undifferentiated sense impressions and projec-
tion systems. To a gradual marking off of one 
element from another and a breaking down of 
wholes into parts which follows cortical diffe-
rentiation and personal dispositions. But the 
inner world of tension and need for satisfac-
tion still structures the child's perception of 
his world so that even when he may recognize 
distinctions he distinguishes on the basis of 
affective tone. So that even as a more developed 
cognitive structure develops and can more accu-
ratily appraise the outer world it rests upon 
the need states. It is when the inner world of 
needs can be adequately coordinated with the 
cognitive picture of reality that a meaningful 
and articulated integration can develop and per-
ception can aid the individual in reaching the 
equally important goals of environmental stabili-
ty, and clarity in perception.Perception is an 
active and personal quest to be master of what 
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one senses. 
We saw that our businessman entered a conference 
with strong personal dispositions and interests 
and that he distorted what he was able to read 
under impoverished sensory conditions to align 
it with his wishes. We could say that his need 
state gave structuring tendencies which caused 
his percepts to meet his needs. He did not first 
read and then distort what he had read, it was 
rather that his needs brought the proper per-
cepts into clarity. There was then a shift along 
the bipolar organization of perception to an 
emphasis on inner factors, because of the im-
poverished sensory conditions, in the external 
world. The inner world is the first world of 
childhood and when poor eyesight causes dif-r 
ficulty in reading a word the inner world of 
dreams and wishes already knows what it wanted 
to read. Young children portray man by drawing 
a circle with arms and legs attached to it no 
matter how often a non-circular human being 
stands before them. As we have already noted we 
could call our businessman's perception at that 
moment autistic because of the over emphasis on 
one pole of reality. This is normal as long as 
the outer pole can be re-established but if it 
cannot be we enter a state of pathology. 
Man is and must be bi-polar in relation to 
reality but this is a dynamic continuum governed 
by the interrelationship between these two 
worlds. The force fields of these two worlds 
vary from individual to individual and from time 
to time but they meet and display their force 
in the act of perception. Would it not then 
follow that, as Murphy states, "If we understand 
the differences in perceiving, we shall go far 
in understanding the differences in the resul-
ting behavior" (1947, p. 332). 
The purpose of this theoretical venture is to 
attempt to use the perceptual act, thus the 
consideration of this term, as a tropic field 
for analysis of states of pathological behavior 
characterized by autistic syndromes. This is 
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admittedly a very ambitious undertaking and it 
will become apparent that this is not a complete 
theory but rather an adventure in trying to use 
various approaches to view complex behavior 
patterns. To be a competent optometrist one must 
have lenses to fit the need of every eye. We 
have at present very few lenses but hope to 
stimulate the search for more. 
V/hat will this venture in theory then consist 
of? It consists of three major purposes. 
To scrutinize the literature on autistic syn-
dromes and to present the current clinical and 
experimental findings. 
The second purpose is to present for considera-
tion a view of autistic perception which will 
attempt to indicate that individual differences 
in perception and autism may be accounted for 
by organizational dispositions of the responding 
individual. Implications for this position will 
be given on both the neural and cognitive 
levels. The last purpose is to speculate on what 
implications such individual organizational 
dispositions will have on behavior theory. 
The above mentioned purposes are of an eclectic 
nature and thus have involved the use of various 
views and important ideas from such men as 
Murphy, Solley, Gardner, Rimland, and Rosenzweig, 
among others. The approach used in this study 
may be said to have been inspired by the 
questions they have posed. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON AUTISTIC 
SYNDROMES. 
The first part of this study will attempt 
through an analysis of the literature to pre-
sent and integrate clinical and experimental 
conceptions of autism. If we ask ourselves what 
is the difference between experimental science 
and clinical science we might be able to answer 
many questions by looking at their areas and 
means of occupation. They both deal with and 
try to understand nature. The experimentalist 
observes and where possible tries to learn of 
the variable constitution of his subject. He 
sketches its development and introduces various 
situations to adjudge its range and types of 
reactions. The clinician concentrates himself 
on a subject of nature which is in a critical 
state of disequilibrium; it deviates in one or 
the other direction from a norm. What he can 
observe are acute reactions in nature; he sees 
their direction and must try to learn of the 
cause and remedy. We can thus well understand 
that these respective faculties of science 
might form different conceptions of the same 
subject. 
The aim of Chapter 1. is to present the clini-
cal and experimental conceptions of autism and 
to emphasize the knowledge that both approaches 
offer us. 
Also the question will be asked: "What are the 
characteristics of autistic states and what 
role does perception play in them?" 
Chapter 2 will concern itself with the theoreti-
cal basis and genisis of autistic states and 
will ask: "What are the respective roles of 
hereditary, biological and environmental fac-
tors in the formation of autistic states?" 
Chapter 3 will discuss the problem of differen-
tiating autistic syndromes and will ask: "Must 
autistic syndromes be diagnosed as basically 
organic or affective disturbances?" 
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CHAPTER I 
Autism as a Conception: Clinical and 
Experimental 
The most vivid ideas concerning autism'come'from 
the clinic for there the clinician is confronted 
by more intense autistic effects than can ever be 
reproduced in the more.controlled and removed 
laboratory world of the experimentalist. The 
clinician deals with and describes a type of 
experience that is intensely felt by the indivi­
dual experiencing it. Life is then the experi­
ment and it displays numerous variations. Tie 
find in the writings of clinicians a picture of 
autistic conditions which is permeated with 
aspects of life. 
A. Clinical positions and findings. 
The psychoanalytic school of thought conceives 
of autism in line with the Freud-Pechner prin­
ciple of stability. Stability is seen to be 
attained and maintained by the doubly perceptive 
ego which governs the organism. It perceives 
internal sensory disturbances of equilibrium as 
sensations and needs. External sensory percep­
tions report the environmental conditions 
prevalent for the gratification of its needs. 
It also integrates and executes functions and 
through confronting its internal percepts with 
the external it can integrate them and cause 
subjective needs to be met and gratified as fax 
as external conditions permit. 
An important dynamic in understanding autism is 
then that autism develops and operates in an 
attempt to integrate internal and external 
aspects of perception for the purpose of grati­
fying subjectively felt needs or drives. Freud 
has stated: 
There is .a general tendency of our nental apparatus . . . which 
веете to find expression in the tenacity with which we hold on 
to the sources of pleasure at our disposal, and in the difficulty 
θ 
with which we renounce then (1959/ Vol. IV, p. lé). 
Schilder in his systematic conception of autism 
(1951) concluded that each individual goes 
through a developmental or learning process in 
cognition and perception. The first stages are 
indefinite percepts followed Ъу a period in 
which they develop more definitiveness. In the 
early phase of this development perception and 
affect are inseparably linked. Thus although 
reality orientation develops further thought 
and perception cannot entirely free themselves 
from the pleasure-pain principle and the early 
affective relations. He formulates then that 
drive-attitudes and needs are essential for 
transforming an image into a percept and that 
an aspect of the drive is always linked to the 
percept. 
Perception then is not impersonal but is rather 
the process or operation of an individual who 
organizes experience and reacts affectively to 
situations. If that organization is predominateJy 
influenced by the affective inner world it 
presents autistic perception. 
Bleuler has called autism a turning-away from 
the external world and has further written that: 
Autistic thinking has its own direction. It mirrors the 
fulfillment of wishes and strivings, thinks away obstacles, 
conceives of impossibilities as possible, and of goals as 
attained. It does so by facilitating those associations which 
correspond to the striving, and by inhibiting those which 
contradict it, that is by mechanisms fanillar to us as 
influences of affects (195I, p. 404). 
The term autistic perception then implies a 
normal transitional point in development in 
which the affective inner world influences the 
structuring the individual imposes upon his 
apprehension of the external world. Realistic 
or bipolar perception is achieved by becoming 
aware of the affective aspects of one's own 
perception or by the acquisition of sufficient 
sensory information to allow the external or 
outer determinants to gain dominance. 
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We would expect from the preceeding to find two 
basic types of conditions which would lead to 
autistic syndromes. An arrest at the point in 
development where the inner affective world 
still dominates the structure that the indivi­
dual imposes on his experience and thus limits 
his relation to the world to a autistic mode of 
being. Or secondly a condition under which 
either the environment is too impoverished or 
the inner world is too affectively accentuated 
for the bipolar relation to remain in equili­
brium. 
Both of the latter conditions are to be found 
in the world of the clinic but in this presen­
tation more emphasis will be given to the first 
condition which deals with an arrest in develop­
ment. The rationale behind this emphasis lies 
in the fact that at an early point in develop­
ment it is possible to find more uniformity of 
pattern and to ascertain the areas of function 
effected through observing the maturational and 
developmental factors blocked by the condition. 
A knowledge of the dominant factors effecting 
perception and their influence on the bipolar 
equilibrium can also aid us in understanding 
the balance of factors present in conditions of 
disequilibrium at higher levels of development. 
In 194З Kanner published his now classic paper 
describing a disturbance of behavior in children 
which he called early infantile autism. Kanner 
named the syndrome that he had circumscribed 
early infantile autism because the children had 
been unusual from the beginning of life and "the 
emergence from the stage of neonatal biological 
helplessness was not, as in the average infant, 
accompanied by a progressively differentiated 
contact with the human environment" (1954)· 
They are alone and self-isolated rather than 
withdrawn. They appear to live in a private, 
inaccessible dream world. Kanner also feels 
that this isolation is not so much an event or 
a process as that it is a fixed state, an 
existence which the child strives to maintain. 
He seems to shield himself from external stimu-
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lation. Along with aloneness Kanner sees an 
anxious ohsessive desire for the preservation 
of sameness as the two principal diagnostic 
criteria of early infantile autism. The latter 
results in a marked limitation in the variety 
of spontaneous activity. Kanner remarks, 
"Regularly displaying a fear of new avenues of 
experience, these children, once having accepted 
a pattern, would incorporate it into the 
restricted set of rituals and reiterate it 
almost endlessly. Any attempt to interfere with 
the pattern produced bursts of rage or episodes 
of acute panic" (195Θ). 
These children also display a strikingly similar 
pattern of motor and language hehavior, along 
with the presence of behavior characteristics 
which display both superior intelligence and 
idiocy. They usually possess no observable 
neurological defects and they come from families 
which are conspicuous by their high intelligence, 
lack of major mental disorders and the normality 
of their other children. 
The disease shows its presence from the 
beginning of life, and although no definite 
disorders or complications of pregnancy have 
been discovered in the mothers it does appear 
that a fairly large number of these children 
are born prematurely. It is, however, notable 
that the disease tends to strike firstborn males. 
The male-female ratio is three or four to one. 
As Rimland reports (1964) these children are 
usually very healthy and attractive. Although 
the child may during the first months show 
unresponsiveness and feeding problems it is 
usually after the fourth month before lack of 
normality is really noted. This may be occasioned 
when it is noted that the child shows no anti­
cipatory reaching out when picked up and that 
he remains stiff and unyielding to the person 
holding him. Prom this point to eighteen months 
such symptoms as rocking, head banging, non-
attention to surroundings, fear of strangers, 
insistence on sameness ritualistic obsessive 
play with mechanical objects, and very atypical 
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language behavior. With further development the 
parents find that they cannot attract their 
child's attention by calling his name and that 
interruption of his seeming mental occupation 
or the order of his world is greeted by either 
panic or temper tantrums. 
The autistic child's avid expression of concen-
tration on his world, normal motor ability, 
phnenomenal ability to recall an exact state of 
ordering of his environment, high spatial 
ability, and in some cases early use of language 
belies the classification of the condition of 
these children as one of the common types of 
mental retardation. 
A number of workers in this field have drawn 
attention to the underlying similarity of the 
peaks of special abilities and interests in a 
background of overall poor ability which is 
typical of the autist as well as the idiot 
savant. More will be said on this point later. 
To give a short example of a highly developed 
area superimposed over an overall low order of 
ability it is of interest to observe that of 
the autistic children who speak many are so 
precocious that they may be using sentences by 
one year of age. It must, however, be noted 
that although his speech may appear highly 
developed it is given no expression and is 
usually elicited as a specific response to a 
stimulus, and not for the purpose of communica-
tion. It is more common for the child not to be 
able to ask or answer a question. 
On the approximate half of the children who speak 
recover to the point of being able to participate 
in society. There is, at this point, no known 
cure for early infantile autism and no form of 
therapy has been shown to significantly 
influence the affliction of these children. 
We observe then under the syndrome described by 
Kanner a condition in which the individual is 
grossly impaired in his ability tT relate him-
self to the world. His relation to the world 
is unipolar. He displays a basic disturbance in 
the ability to relate sensation with experience. 
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Man communicates with the world according to 
the manner after which he structures or 
perceives the information he obtains through 
his modes of relatedness. If we study how he 
perceives the world we will learn of his modes 
of relatedness and of the reasons for his 
actions. 
We note that in the syndrome of early infantile 
autism that a condition exists which alters or 
blocks the individuals full realization of 
communication with the world. These children 
suffer from deficiencies in various areas of 
perception and communication which prevent them 
from formulating organized concepts with which 
to communicate. They can neither differentiate 
themselves from the world or from another. 
The purpose of the following two chapters of 
this study are to analize the perceptual 
apparatus and process employed by the child 
afflicted with early infantile autism through 
a consideration of his modes of relatedness to 
the world. This will be done in that it is felt 
that through gaining awareness of the per-
ceptual processes employed by the early autistic 
child it will be possible tö illustrate more of 
the variables involved under the rubric autistic 
perception, and in regard to perceptual learning. 
Б. Experimental theory and mechanisms. 
Although it is not possible to reproduce or 
manipulate all of the affects, drives and 
motivations of life in the experimental 
laboratory it is possible to more intensively 
study the influence of particular variables 
under specified conditions. Also it is of value 
to attempt to integrate the experimentally 
formed theory with the clinical insights. 
Solley and Murphy (i960) discuss the thoughts 
on autism that Helson developed (1953> Ρ· l) 
and agree with his equation of proneness to 
autism with excessive susceptibility to inner 
determinants of perception. Helson feels that 
this excessive susceptibility can arise from at 
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least four sources-"memories, residual traces 
from previously experienced dangers, excessive 
anticipatory reactions before danger actually 
threatens, or the result of magnified feed-back 
mechanisms wherein awareness of one's own 
bodily processes figure prominently". 
This approach stresses the concept of perception 
as a resultant of inner and outer determinants 
and emphazises that a poor psychophysical 
relation between the subject's reports and the 
nature of his environment implies autistic per-
ception. 
Three basic experimental conditions for causing 
autism are impoverishing, overly stimulating, 
or dulling of the external stimulus environment 
all of which present a disequilibrium which 
must be made up for by inner determinants. 
Anthony has conducted two studies with autistic 
children which are of interest. The first 
involved the making of a loud sound at a fixed 
distance from the backs of the children. Each 
child was rated on a scale at one end of which 
there was a startle response, followed by a 
bodily movement to or away from the sound, the 
turning of the head to or away from the source 
of the sound, a change of facial expression 
indicating awareness, and finally, no observable 
reaction. He reports (1958) that the results 
showed that, "the psychotic children showed no 
startle response at any time. In marked contrast 
to the neurotic controls, they showed no 
preparatory set after the first experience. 
They invariably turned away from the source of 
sound and not towards it. They showed a rapid 
adaptation to the situation, and lastly, gave 
a large number of zero or "no" responses (these 
were given by no control cases)". 
Anthony had also tried this experiment with the 
dropping of a series of weights and in both 
experiments concluded that the psychotic barrier 
is psychological and pervasive in nature. 
In his second experiment which investigated the 
nature of perceptual discrimination charac-
teristic of these children he employed an 
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apparatus constructed for social conditioning 
which involved a chocolate hall that ran down 
a trough and presented itself on a platform 
facing the child. For the conditioning stimulus 
he used a flash of light and a "buzzer. He re-
ports (1958, p. 221) that, "After some initial 
hesitation, all the psychotic children reached 
for the chocolate as soon as they saw it appear. 
(He employed a group of 2-3 year old children 
as control.) The results were as follows: none 
of the psychotic children could he conditioned 
with a light stimulus; there was some condi-
tioning with sound hut less than with the con-
trols; lack of reinforcement brought about 
quicker extinction in the autistic group, and 
thereafter the tendency seemed completely and 
permanently lost (checked after a period of 
three months) - they could never be conditioned 
again in this particular situation and with 
this type of conditioning". He concludes that 
among many other possible factors it appears 
that it is the rapid adaptation to the unexpec-
ted stimulus, combined with the rapid extinc-
tion of the unrewarding stimulus, which helps 
to dissociate the psychotic child from its 
environment thereby sustaining its autism. 
If we examine Anthony's conclusions once again 
and attempt te relate them to the sources 
posited by Helson as generating excessive 
susceptibility to autistic perception we would 
be inclined to examine the last three, which 
stress residual traces from previously ex-
perienced dangers, excessive anticipatory 
reactions before danger actually threatens, or 
the result of magnified feed-back mechanisms 
of one's own bodily processes. This choice 
would be made on the fact that Anthony noted 
rapid adaptation to the unexpected stimulus 
and rapid extinction of the rewarding stimulus 
as traits of autism. 
The first of these three sources functions by 
the accumulation of perceptual traces through 
learning and the consequent formation of an 
adaptation level or frame of reference. The 
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second works Ъу establishing strong response 
sets to escape or to avoid the onset of harmful 
stimulation. Helson requires in the third source 
which functions by magnified feedback mecha­
nisms that the individual become aware of this 
process. 
Let us now inquire into which of these sources 
of susceptibility, or combination thereof, 
would most adequately explain the phenomena 
observed by Anthony. The first two mechanisms 
imply avoidance techniques and if we return to 
Anthony's first experiment involving startle 
reaction we find that the autists showed no 
preparatory set after the first experience and 
never displayed a full startle reaction. The 
latter would tend to place emphasis on a 
mechanism which consists of an adaptation level 
formation and less emphasis on the considera­
tion of a mechanism functioning only on the 
basis of excessive anticipatory reactions. If 
we note that Anthony speaks of a "rapid" adapta­
tion we may see the possibility that a magnified 
feedback mechanism could accentuate the accu­
mulation of perceptual traces and the formation 
of an adaptation level which could indeed be 
called rapid. Helson sees the formation of an 
adaptational level as a learned response in 
reaction to previous danger and requires that 
the individual become aware of the feedback. 
Further examination of the literature may help 
us to discover if these machanisms would be 
adequate to explain the behavior described by 
Anthony. 
Experimental research has made it clear that 
under behavior restrictive conditions of no 
escape, and no avoidance of noxious stimuli 
that the organism defends itself through inhibi­
ting the unpleasant affect, making internal 
adjustments of emergency mechanisms to produce 
faster adaptation to the UCS, and direction of 
attention away from the outer world. These 
steps in turn produce a less realistic evalua­
tion of the situation and along with withdrawal 
from external events a heightening of autistic 
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effects. 
It has also been demonstrated Ъу Solomon and 
Wynne (1954) that avoidance behavior developed 
under traumatic avoidance conditions is almost 
impossible to extinguish because due to the 
speed of the avoidance reaction anxiety which 
never gets a chance to occur is conserved. 
They also propose a mechanism of "partial 
irreversibility" of the response which implies 
that the physiochemical balance of the organism 
is partially and permanently shifted so that 
the readiness to respond in various ways is 
altered. It is then possible that the organism 
may prevent the full rearousal of anxiety ex­
perienced under a traumatic experience through 
the formation of an adaptation level based on 
a linking of perceptual traces to strong auto­
nomic feedback. This pre-tensing of the inner 
world tends to override the present evidence 
from exteroceptive sources. 
It appears that we could using the preceeding 
mechanisms explain much of the behavioral reac­
tions of the autistic children described by 
Anthony if we could further explain what type 
of traumata could bring the child to display 
such a pervasive unresponsiveness to his world 
that he is not only incapable of being con­
ditioned or showing a complete startle reaction 
but is further characterized by defeciencies in 
integration, generalization, communication and 
physical and emotional responsiveness, from 
the beginning of life. 
Man and his world constitute an inseparable 
entity; if we find a state of disassociation 
we must examine both sides of the interaction 
before we can hope to find the balance of 
factors causing the arrest in adaptation. The 
development of man is actualized through a 
continual expansion and refinement of his modes 
of relatedness with the world. For this to 
occur man must be able to exercise his potency 
to change his state of being. He evolves his 
potentialities through realizing them in his 
communication with the world. If this dynamic 
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interrelationship is attuned to the disposi-
tional nature of man we observe the environmen-
tal specificity inducing more and more speci-
ficity in an organism which accepts it. As -he 
organism matures in the field forces of 
reciprocity between inner and outer forces 
differentiation occurs marking off the nature 
of both worlds and setting the stage for inter-
action and interdependence of parts which leads 
to a level of integrated action. Adaptation 
also involves an organization of continuity so 
that each level of development is based on a 
meaningful dynamic structure or unity which 
gives the present relation to the past. As 
Murphy so eloquently states: 
The life procese is not simply a series of events within the 
organism, but a field of events in which inner and outer 
processes constitute a complex totality. The potentialities 
of life as a spore of a fern, can conveniently be conceived 
as packed within a particle, but the life process itself is 
not so narrowly localized. A man's life, too, is not within 
his body, nor is his personality. 
Potentialities, yes; if we mean by personality the potentiality 
of individual achievement or social reaction they are there. 
The potentialities also exist in an environment which liberally 
interacts with the potentialities within the man. The actual 
event, the personal life history, is an inner outer reciprocity, 
as is all life; personality as we know it is not within the 
skin, but coextensive with the individual life process, the 
sequences of liberated potentialities (1947, p. 37)· 
The integrity of a living system is intimately 
related to the maintenance of the relative 
constancy of the interrelations so that varia-
tions in one aspect of the balanced system 
induce compensatory changes in the other 
aspects. Over accentuation of either inner or 
outer processes results in the reconstituting 
of the individual at a new level. This level 
will again be a balance of predispositions as 
affected by specific environmental forces. 
The purpose of the following chapter will be 
to analize both mans dispositions and the 
influence of environment upon them with special 
reference to the particular state of dissocia-
la 
tion embodied in the state of early infantile 
autism. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Balance of Organism and Environment 
Grinker has stated, "Living organisms are open 
systems communicating and in circular process 
with their environments . . . . The primary 
source of action of the living unit arises from 
an internal energy system which is the stimulus 
for the first interactions and exchanges of the 
organism with its environment; only later do 
perceptive systems evolve and function in this 
process. Thus, constitutionally derived wound-up 
activity of the organization facilitates its 
existence before exteroceptive functions have 
developed" (1956, p. 45)· 
Before man ventures into the world he has been 
endowed with hereditary potentialities and has 
entertained a vegetative period of existence 
which has permitted certain chemical, biological, 
and neurological developments to take place 
according to a phylogenetic constructional plan 
which means as Prick notes, "that the organism, 
anterior to every activity is potentially already 
"adapted" to a certain milieu" (1959» P· 15). If 
the protective position of intra-uterine exis­
tence is not disturbed the embryo continues its 
passive-receptive embedded existence until birth. 
With birth and the state of separation from 
complete embeddedness drives and affects arise 
and as Schachtel comments, "function . . . to 
bring the organism, now separated from embedding 
shelter and energy supply, into contact with the 
sources of energy supply on its new level of 
existence and, within the larger environment, to 
maintain its contact with a favorable environ­
ment and avoid ал unfavorable one" (1959» p.69)· 
Grinker speaks of a wound-up internal energy 
system as the stimulus for the first interaction 
with the environment and Schachtel notes the 
arousel of drives and affects upon separation 
from embeddedness, but as Schachtel further 
points out two basic types of affects appear in 
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the infant after birth. The first, familiar 
from Freudian theory, is a distress or avoidance 
affect involving non-directed motor activity, 
rising need tension, and global discomfort, 
called "embeddedness affect" by Schachtel, which 
can be seen as a longing for the restful, tension-
less, sheltered equilibrium of complete embedded-
ness. The second is seen in eager, concentrated, 
somewhat directed, sustained, and activity sus­
taining tension displayed to varying degrees by 
children in the nursing situation which Schachtel 
calls "activity-affect". Schachtel further feels 
that these two types of affect are the proto­
types of two types of emotion and that their 
quality, relative strength and frequency are 
important in the formation and functioning of 
later personality. He states, "The decisive 
difference between these two types of affect is 
that one is characterized by helpless distress 
(embeddedness-affect), the other by active 
coping with a drive tension or by active rela­
ting to the environment (activity-affect). They 
represent two different ways of dealing with the 
separation from the intra-uterine situation of 
continuous supply and shelter" (1959» P· 29). 
Considerable difference in the congenital 
strength of these affect types can also be 
observed in different individuals. 
Schachtel reports on Stirnimann's (1940, p. 9Θ) 
also finding characteristic differences in the 
reaction of newborn children to unpleasant 
stimuli: one baby will withdraw from the 
stimulus, another will cry restlessly, while a 
third will actively try to do something against 
the cause of the unpleasant sensation. It has 
also been shown that some infants display 
attentive gazing, differentiated reactions to 
colors, and discrimination of sensory qualities 
to various degrees within the first weeks of 
life. These types of activities do point up the 
mutual presence of affects involved in activity-
sustaining tension and distress tension and 
connect them with constitutional dispositions. 
The balance of these dispositions can be seen to 
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have import for the childs ability to establish 
effective emotional links with his environment, 
and fer the future development of his poten-
tialities. 
All of the foregoing supplies us with what fun-
damental information indicating that even before 
any perceptual learning can take place, the 
infant can perceive. By this is meant that some 
acts of perceiving exist prior to any restruc-
turing; perception is neither completely learned 
or innate but rather a proper sensitive relation 
of organismic disposition and world. 
The infant's early maturation begins with and is 
based on the early affect world which is a world 
of fusions of internal feelings and sensory 
aspects of the impinging external environment. 
In the beginning the newborn experiences distress 
at any change which destroys his comfort (homeo-
stasis) but even with discomfort specific sen-
sory qualities are awakened which bring the 
first traces of turning to the external and 
perceiving the sensory qualities emanating from 
it. The proper stimulus for a sensory modality 
fulfills the purpose of activating it which in 
turn if pleasurable excites a drive for reacti-
vating it. 
It occurs then, during a brief period of wake-
fulness, that an infant will begin to turn 
toward impinging sensory stimuli which through 
their pleasureful nature will function as guides 
directing drives to their source of satisfaction 
in the external world. These pleasureful sensa-
tions and fused perceptions which finally result 
in the infant's motor activity leading him to 
the pleasing contact with environmental objects 
are essential steps in the infant's self-actu-
alization; they also furnish an important link 
in the infant's motivation for the continued 
exercise of its muscles and senaes, its motor 
coordination, and its exploration of the envi-
ronment as well as of its own body and physical 
capacities. Thèse factors will again be influn-
ced by the constitutional dispositions of the 
infant and the openness that they provide 
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him wi th. 
Schachtel states that, "The development from 
the predominance of the experience of impinging 
stimuli as disturbing the homeostatic state of 
comfortahle emheddedness to the increasing im­
portance of specific attractive and repellant 
stimuli in fused autocentric perception of 
specific sensory qualities, and eventually to 
the heginning of the perception of ohjects and 
ohject qualities is of hasic significance in 
the ontogenetic development of sensory percep­
tion and is closely linked with the development 
of attention" (1959, p. 157). 
The infant begins his discovery of objects 
through starting to notice that there is 
"something" which impinges on him exciting him, 
causing pleasure or distress, which at times is 
lost or reappears and allows him to direct his 
drives toward it. This something is what Werner 
has designated as a "thing-of-action" (194Θ, pp. 
65-66). In the beginning this thing-of-action 
is only the something which when contacted 
arouses self-centered, pleasurable fused percep­
tion. It then becomes more definitely a thing-
to-suck, a thing-to-hold or grip, a thing-to-
feel; this progress follows the specific develop­
ment of the primary senses for a thing can only 
be known on the level that one has developed or 
exists. The infant gradually grows to realize 
that it is his own activity that produces the 
pleasurable sensations and what happens to it 
is I'elated to what he does to it. This indicates 
that the infant has indeed already progressed 
quite some distance along the gap between him­
self and the external world and shows the 
beginning of objectivity. 
Through such contacts he eventually learns to 
connect his sensation with his experience and 
to approach the day where the object exists for 
him even though he does not have contact with 
it. Koffka (1931) has developed the thesis that 
the mind grows by the successive laying down of 
memorie traces which articulate with immediate 
perceptual traces in producing percepts. The 
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infant can now progress to learning new ways of 
relating to or making contact with his objects, 
thereby discovering and integrating new aspects 
of it. These various developmental steps over-
lap, and only gradually does the infant develop 
from only knowing his objects through his sub-
ject centered pleasurable sensory contact with 
them to a more direct object centered interest 
in which the object can be known and appreciated 
for itself. 
This development is mirrored by the infant's 
sensory development for his senses mediate and 
determine his modes of relatedness with the 
external world, they are the modes and ways of 
communication between subject and object. The 
first phase of development which was charac-
terized by the subject-centeredness of the 
infant's approach and relatedness to his world 
is the stage of maturation in which his primary 
senses (thermal sense, taste, smeel and passive 
sense of touch) dominate his modes of receptivity. 
These are senses which inform of comfort or dis-
comfort and tell more about how the object 
affects the infant than of the qualities of the 
object. They give basically one dimensional 
fused-percepts. VThile the latter do not lead to 
a full encounter with the object they do prepare 
the stage for higher developments. Throughout 
the latter phase the senses of sight and hearing 
have in their underdeveloped status also 
functioned in a subject-centered manner. It is 
only with the development of sight and hearing 
that the gap between subject and object can be 
effectively crossed for it is with these senses 
that an external object can be objectively 
appraised both in the sense that a wealth of 
sensory information is gained along with distance 
and spatial relations but also in the sense that 
they are further removed from the fusion of 
perceived sensory qualities and pleasure-un-
pleasure feelings. These senses, including active 
touching, help to objectify the external world 
for they clarify the external existence of the 
object as independant of that of the perceivers. 
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These two levels of sensory relatedness overlap 
and exist side by side in all of the infants 
future development just as do the embeddedness 
and activity affects and drives from which they 
spring and on which they are based. 
The initial pleasure that the newborn experiences 
in his first contacts with the external world 
free him, as it were, from the restraints of 
embeddedness affects, to release his internal 
activity-affects and needs to prolong and repeat 
his contact with the object. This activity 
interest, augments his sensory development to the 
point where his world opens to the object he 
needs. 
The link of connectedness to the outer world 
progresses from the smile at resensation or 
recognition of the familiar, in or about the 
third month, which stems from the continuity 
of a subjective schema, to a state of alarm 
and anxiety at the unfamiliar or strange, but a 
few months later. This conflict stage marks 
another transition point for it signals the 
advent of the realization of the independence of 
objects. The infant may at this point open his 
world and expand it through accepting the chal-
lenge of newness or attempt to embed himself in 
the familiar guarding the uniformity and con-
tinuation of his familiar environment. 
The healthy young infant aided by the support 
of his parents ventures into the world as an 
explorer. Y/here this development does not take 
place it may either be due to a deficiency state 
in the infant or to the inadequacy of support 
offered by the parents. This point will be 
further elaborated shortly. If the infant is 
defective in supplying cues to his needs or if 
the parents through inadequacy or abnormality 
have been unable to interrupt his needs the 
embeddedness principle may reinstate itself with 
pathological strength, with the result that the 
encounter with the world is experienced in a 
dominantly subject-centered way as an unwelcome 
impinging of disturbing stimuli. This may have 
such an influence on the perceptual sphere that 
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.the principal sensory modalities which relate 
man to his external environment and especially 
those which objectify most, sight and hearing, 
may show oversensitivity to stimuli to the point 
that it is felt as disturbing, distracting, or 
even painful. 
With the shift to the object-centered mode of 
perception we can observe a new phase of memory 
development which transcends the passive re-
sensing of recognition and leads to the inaugura-
tion of voluntary recall of constructs which 
from part of a rationally coherent organization. 
Before going further it must be noted that a 
very strong affinity exists between the passive 
resensing kind of memory and the subjective mode 
of perception dominated by the lower senses, and 
between voluntary recall and the predominantly 
object-centered mode of perception. Percepts 
formed on the subjective level are usually not 
accessible to voluntary recall while percepts 
formed on the object-directed level lend them-
selves to voluntary recall because of their 
being ordered into the schemata of a conceptual 
framework. As schemata, however, they often are 
felt to be shadows of the real experience. The 
resensing type of memory, although it is not 
able to be voluntarily recalled, may upon the 
sensing of a similar sensation reappear with the 
vividness of the first experience or it may 
remain as an eidetic image irçhich continues long 
after stimulation has ceased only to disappear 
and then reappear with the same vividness when 
a need has been reactivated with which it was 
associated. 
The tool which has slowly progressed with the 
infants development and has permitted him to reach 
reach a realization of the complexity of the 
outer world is focal attention. We can identify 
focal attention by its acts of directing atten-
tion at a particular object, attempting to grasp 
it mentally through sustained and renewed exami-
nations of its aspects and relations, first in 
a more passive, receptive, reactive and then in 
a more active, taking-hold, structuring, inte-
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grating phase, the predominance of these phases 
varying both inter-and intra-individually, and 
finally through the exclusion of the rest of 
the environmental and internal fields from 
awareness. 
The full development of focal attention leads 
to the state in the child's life in which 
distinct needs and feelings become increasingly 
differentiated and discrete objects emerge from 
the environment. These objects will ultimately 
be conceived by the child as having an existance 
of their own even when he is not in sensory 
contact with them. This is possible because only 
through focal attention can other needs and ten-
sion be abated long enough for the object to be 
analized and to obtain constancy, which in turn 
requires freedom from a too overwhelming need 
or tension through the aid of a constant and 
supportive milieu. 
With this initiation of the idea of object con-
stancy, focal attention gradually becomes capable 
of being incorporated into thought, instead of 
remaining only on the level of perception. The 
first stage in this development is when the 
child not only becomes able to focus attention 
on an object through the senses, but also becomes 
able to focus attention on the idea of an object. 
This capacity develops in the second year along 
with the development of speech, without which it 
could not progress above a rudimentary primitive 
level. 
The last stage in the development of focal atten-
tion involves the child's reflective focusing on 
his own feelings and experiments which is accom-
panied by the development of the idea of "I" and 
the continuity of the self. 
We speak of the newborn infant as having been 
brought into life by his mother and of thus 
entering the external world but we must imme-
diately add the fact that for the first few 
years the infant requires that the environment 
be mediated to him through the mothering person. 
Also the mother, in her relationship to the child, 
must play different biological roles according 
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to the stage of the child's development. The 
infant-mother dyad must supply the infant not 
only with food, contact, warmth, social learning, 
and love hut also a source of stimulation-inhibi-
tion for an infant with still inadequate inhibi-
tory capacity. She must ideally then, be able to 
supply sufficient inhibition-stimulation of 
affect that the infant's distress, embeddedness-
affects, are adequately dampered until he can 
mobililize inhibitory capacity and that his ac-
tivity affects are properly stimulated to promote 
further interest in the external. She is as 
Diamond (1963, p. 305) says the child's auxiliaiy 
cortex. Her influence can balance emotion and 
supply stimulation for sensory advancement. She 
is the ever dependable gap between infant and 
world and the stimulus which leads and guides 
the infant to the knowledge of the external 
other, She infuses not only knowledge but also 
culture. 
Maturation is then far from being automatic; it 
is rather always the outcome not of a lack of 
interference with natural developments but of a 
very special set of environmental circumstances 
without which very different development may 
take place. 
It could perhaps be said that the child's later 
capacity to attend to itself and to the world, 
to perceive and diagnose its own needs and 
distresses, their nature and intensity along 
with their locality, and to adequately perceive 
the objects which it requires, has had a pre-
cursor and stimulator in the mothering person. 
Main (I958, p. 6) believes that, "The perceptive 
mother not only aids the growth of the ego but 
of perception itself . . . (and that) It may 
even be that the very genesis of perception in 
a human being is conditional . . . on appropriate 
introjections of the perceptive abilities of 
another". 
The smiling response of infants to the stimulus 
of a face appears at approximately five weeks 
of age and may perhaps be seen as the first link 
in the process of primary socialization since it 
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occurs more ih connection with a human face than 
with any other sort of stimulation. The adequate 
mother-infant relation facilitates this process 
and through its stimulation aids the development 
of perceptual discrimination so that by approxi-
mately the third month recognition is present. 
This in turn sets the stage for further refine-
ment of perception and the ultimate realization 
of the independence of others and the discrimi-
nation of familiar from strange, which takes 
place in roughly the fifth to sixth month. This 
also marks the point of attachment to particular 
individuals, mainly the mothering figure and 
completes the second stage of primary sociali-
zation. The fear accompanying realization of 
strangeness can be balanced by the now more 
articulated mother figure who by constant support 
aids in the development of the concept of con-
stancy in the world. All of the latter facilitate 
and stimulate the forthcoming development of 
locomotion and ^f language. As can be seen the 
stages of social development are realized through 
the support and stimulation given by the mother 
and follow or reflect the neurological maturation 
of the organism, which we have just discussed. 
Tie again see that the life development of an 
individual depends upon the realization of a 
liberation of his potentialities through an 
interaction with an environment which liberally 
reacts to them. 
The normal healthy infant evokes supportive 
reaction or behavior from his mother by providing 
and developing cues which serve as releasers for 
such behavior, thus instigating the inner-outer 
reciprocity. The somewhat defective child may 
fail to or not be able to provide cues which can 
be satisfactorily interpreted by an attentive 
and receptive mother who is thus unable to 
provide the necessary supportive functions to 
aid the infant's perceptual development. Thus 
its deficiencies may be accentuated by influences 
which are quite properly caled social, but which 
are part of a relentless cycle of social in-
fluences initiated by an organic defect. On the 
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other hand a normal child may show* disrupted or 
thwarted development if the mother is unrespon­
sive or overly stimulating in reaction to his 
cues, thus heing incapable of providing the 
support and proper stimulation need for normal 
development. Here we see an accentuation of the 
social or environmental variables to a point 
where they disrupt the normality of the child's 
communicative apparatus. The situation may, how­
ever, also exist that a defective child is met 
Ъу an unresponsive or overly stimulating, thus 
defective environment which will indeed further 
disrupt his development. 
The time has now come that we must directly 
consider the respective roles of hereditary, 
biological, and environmental factors in the 
formation of autistic states. This probing will 
be even more refined and delineated to deal 
mainly with an inquiry into the major factors 
manifested under the autistic syndrome indenti-
fied by Kanner, because of the clarity with 
which he has circumscribed this condition and 
because of its theoretical importance. Also the 
early presence of this disturbance brings all 
of the factors into question and offers a screen 
upon which to project them. 
An examination of the literature over Kanner's 
syndrome quickly reveals two basically opposed 
fields of thought. One field of thought main­
tains that early infantile autism is the earliest 
form of schizophrenia and that it is basically 
an affective or emotional-social disturbance 
while the other field of thought stresses that 
this syndrome indentifies an oligophrenic defi­
ciency or organic dementia. The theoretical 
space between the psychogenic and organic posi­
tions has until recently consisted of the vener­
able "no-mans-land". In accordance with recent 
advancements in both neurophysiology and psycho­
logy it is the purpose of this present study to 
attempt to place the proper emphasis on both 
factors operating in this disorder and through 
this approach to elaborate the multi-factor 
nature of perception and in particular autistic 
30 
perception. 
Before we enter this attempt to clarify factors 
perhaps it is best if we first review the symp-
toms Kanner has isolated under his syndrome and 
attempt to show what they mean in terms of dis-
rupted and thwarted development and then review 
the facts known about the environments of these 
children. 
Kanner stresses the early onset of this disorder 
and the consummate lack of a progressively dif-
ferentiated contact with the human environment 
which appears in the form of an aloneness or 
isolation that it seems they try to maintain. 
This would imply either; an overly strong con-
stitutional tendency toward embeddedness with 
the affect being displayed as desire for isola-
tion, an organic deficiency state which did not 
support adequate cue formation or which needed 
extra protection from normal environmental 
stimuli, or an unresponsive environment which 
offered no support but only rejection, or any 
combination of these factors. Their rituals, 
desire for sameness, rocking, non-attention to 
surroundings yet fear of unfamiliarity or 
strangeness, and seeming deafness along with 
visual avoidance of others would place them as 
developmentally stopped at a level of develop-
ment characterized by recognition and resensing 
of the familiar. This would conform their pre-
ferred use of proximal sensory modalities their 
desire for repetitive actions, their lack of 
object constancy, their phenenomenal ability to 
recall exact details set in an inability to 
abstract, and their lack of emotional and social 
attachment to their mothers. They appear to be 
neurologically intact and present an appearance 
of intelligence. The conclusion might seem to 
be that they must be thwarted by a cold, un-
responsive environment and mother. \7e might be 
even further inclined towards this opinion when 
we hear from Kanner: 
Most of the parents declare outright that they are uncom-
fortable in the presence of people; they prefer reading, 
writing, painting, making music, or just "thinking". Those 
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wno speak of themselves as sociable tend to qualify this by 
stating that they have no use for ordinary chatter. They are, 
on the whole, polite and dignified people who are impressed 
by seriousness and disdainful of anything that smacks of 
frivolity (1949, p. 421). 
Although it has Ъееп proven that as a group the 
parents of children indentified by Kanner's syn­
drome are of very high intelligence, hold and 
execute very responsible positions, and that the 
rate of mental illness among the parents is 
strikingly low when compared to the normal popu­
lation the inclination toward viewing this dis­
turbance as environmentally determined has been 
set forth by Kanner's and others descriptions 
of the parents' treatment of the children. 
Kanner states: 
Host of the patients were exposed from the beginning to 
coldness, obsessiveness, and a mechanical type of attention 
to material needs only . . . . Their withdrawal seems to be 
an act of turning away from such a situation to seek comfort 
in solitude (1949, p. 425). 
This type of life situation might be exactly the 
sort to stimulate the formation of adaption 
levels based on previously experienced dangers 
or to generate excessive anticipatory reactions 
both of which as Helson noted lead to autistic 
perception. The fact, however, still remains 
that we cannot explain, with this approach, all 
of the child's behavior. It appears to be of 
greater value to identify with Rimland when he 
emphasizes that, "unless one is already committed 
to the view that the parental behavior and per­
sonalities were not influenced by their own 
inherited biochemical or neurological natures, 
one cannot attribute the child's behavior to 
environmental rather than hereditary factors. 
The evidence supports both views equally well" 
(1962, p. 24). 
A. Psychogenic position. 
Those individuals subscribing to the position 
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that Kanner's autistic syndrome is environmen­
tally transmitted do so mainly on the hasis of 
the personality characteristics found to Ъе 
typical of the parents of these children, in 
particular their lack of complete emotional 
responsiveness. They further hase their position 
on the fact that certain children raised in in­
stitutions show considerable emotional difficul­
ties which have Ъееп described as artifacts cf 
maternal deprivation. Also no consistent neuro­
logical damage has been found to be associated 
with this condition. This point, however, solves 
no problems for neurological methods are, at 
this time, not advanced enough to accurately 
measure the functioning of central nervous sy­
stem processes. Both the considerations of the 
parental lack of emotional responsiveness and 
the personality disturbances experienced by some 
children under conditions of maternal depriva­
tion seem te give too much weight to environmen­
tal factors at the expense of hereditary dispo­
sitions. It appears that to reach a full and 
complete description of any such condition we 
cannot set arbitrary limits to the influence 
that hereditary, neurological, and environmental 
factors will play in it. This is especially true 
when we note the specificity of the symptom 
pattern in this condition, and the unique and 
specific personality-intellectual configuration 
found in the parents of these children. The 
psychogenic position indeed has validity in 
stressing the importance of environmental fac­
tors in establishing and maintaining emotional 
intactness. It has been seen, however, through 
the attempts at therapeutic intervention or 
alteration of this disturbance that any amount 
of environmental manipulation does not com­
pletely remove the symptom pattern. 
It appears rather that in early infantile autism 
we may be able to identify a particular type of 
genetic pattern in the parents which re-occurs 
in an impaired form in the child and through its 
interaction with the environment displays auti­
stic behavior. This approach and its merits have 
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been accentuated by Rimland(19^2) and as he has 
shown the most clarity of conception can be 
achieved only when we consider the nature-
nurture problem not as a paradox but as a dyna-
mic interaction system which must be thoroughly 
investigated. 
The hereditary system of predispositions dis-
plays itself through its responsibility for the 
varying effects of known environmental pressures 
upon different organisms. A trait is neither 
primarily hereditary or primarily environmental 
but rather a hereditary tendency brought to its 
fulfillment by a specific environmental pressure. 
An abnormal trait may display itself in reaction 
to certain environmental pressure but we must 
not think that if we remove the pressure we 
remove the tendency. The variability from person 
to person in respect to each trait within any 
sample of people under any sample of conditions 
can be treated with respect to the question 
posed by Murphy: 
How is the variability of individuals related to the variability 
of stock and of environment? Some stocks are empirically widely 
variable; others . . . are relatively invariable. When subjected 
to roughly uniform environmental forces, there are inevitably 
wider individual differences in the former than in the latter. . 
In the same way, two roughly equated samples from the same stock 
may be exposed to two environments, the first narrow, rigid, and 
homogeneous, the second wide, flexible, and heterogeneous. The 
observed members of the second group will display a variability 
in accordance with the range of environmental excitations. 
Combining the two principles, whenever we have known and mea-
surable variabilities of stock and known and measurable varia-
bilities in envirenmental pressures, we can calculate the 
approximate relative contributions made by the two types of 
factors to the observed variability of developing individuals 
(1947, P. 56). 
In attempting to discover the genesis of Kanner's 
autistic syndrome we must of course observe the 
environmental situations that these children 
encounter. The unique and specific personality-
intelligence configuration displayed by the 
parents of these children along with the speci-
ficity of the syndrome itself would tend, as has 
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Ъееп noted, to confirm at first glance an en­
vironmental position but it then leaves the 
equally tenable genetic position still unanswer­
ed. This is not as unattractive a problem as it 
might appear. Most behavioral research has had 
to place more stress on the environmental in­
fluences effecting an individual than on his 
constitutional predispositions simply because 
it has been so difficult to discover constitu­
tional patterns which could account for the 
complexity and specificity of behavior displayed. 
If, however, it can be shown that this syndrome 
of specific symptoms is determined by a rare 
recessive trait or other biological factors it 
then through its specificity offers us an excel­
lent demonstration of the specificity of the 
constitutional dispositions and may also supply 
new information concerning the mode of opera­
tions of the brain. 
B. Organic and hereditary arguments. 
Rimland (1962, p. 45) i n his exposition of his 
theory on autism elaborates on Kanner's original 
points against the psychogenic position and 
presents significant evidence that this syndrome 
can be considered a specific type of organic 
impairment in a background of genetic predis­
positions: He indicates that some autistic chil­
dren are born of parents who although they do 
fit the stereotype of intelligence and drive 
typically reported of these parents do not dis­
play any lack of emotional responsiveness. Other 
parents who meet both aspects of the stereotype 
are never observed to have children who display 
the autistic syndrome. The siblings of autistic 
children are usually found to be normal. The 
children identified as autistic are reported to 
have been behaviorally unusual "from the moment 
of birth". A consistent ratio of three or four 
boys to one girl is reported. Those reports 
mentioning monozygotic twins have all reported 
that both children were afflicted with autism. 
It is observable that organic disorders such as 
35 
those caused Ъу overoxygénâtion produce the 
symptoms typical of this syndrome. No form of 
psychotherapy has Ъееп demonstrated to Ъе аЪІе 
to alter the course of the disease. If autism 
is a reaction to environmental factors it would 
be expected that there would Ъе not only a di­
versity of manifestations but also a variation 
in the gradation of intensity of affliction both 
of which are missing. Lastly, the high degree of 
interindividual similarity in the symptomology 
of autism would seem to stress organic factors 
above environmental ones; as would the high 
similarity between the symptomology of autism 
and "brain injury". This evidence is consistent 
in offering no support to the psychogenic posi­
tion and adds consistent support to the exten­
sion of the idea of organic pathology. 
These features further tend to indicate that the 
autistic syndrome is based on an organic impair­
ment of a localized nature set in a strong 
genetic field. 
Rimland further theorizes that the symptomology 
characteristic of the autistic syndrome can Ъе 
understood in terms of a single critical concept 
which he formulates in this way: "the child with 
early infantile autism is grossly impaired in a 
function basic to all cognition; the ability to 
link new stmuli with remembered experience" 
(1962, p. 69). He sees the child as impaired in 
the ability to establish vital connections 
between sensation and memory with the result 
that new sensation can be related to only sharply 
limited fragments of memory. Y/lth the result 
that it is impossible for the child to derive 
meaning from his experience. As a consequence of 
this impairment the child cannot integrate his 
sensations into a comprehensible whole with the 
result that he can neither understand relation­
ships nor think in terms of concepts, symbols, 
or abstractions. In essence this interpretation 
of the impairment is not new. Goldstein, Scheerer, 
and Rothmann had already emphasized the exces­
sively concrete nature of their thought. 
The molecular perception characteristic of these 
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children demonstrates their inability to cross 
the gap in development from recognition and re-
sensing of the familiar to voluntary recall. As 
we have already noted this developmental stage 
is one step below the point where object con-
stancy and meaning are established and an em-
phathetic social relation is formed with the 
mother. Their high level of form-perception and 
retentive memories are based on recognition, 
resensation and edetic imagery. His object world 
is neither constant nor differentiated nor are 
his needs or feelings. He resists change which 
he cannot comprehend and seeks familiar and 
mechanical objects which are predicatable. He 
is related to the world in terms of his primary 
or subject-centered sensory modalities. 
Rimland further examines the pathology of 
thought displayed by these children and notes 
that one aspect emerges as being of particular 
significance. He notes: 
There is remarkable identity between input and response, between 
what is heard and what is said . . . . To make a mechanical 
analogy, it seems very much as though the material had entered 
the nervous system on a single track, proceeded to a point of 
storage without ever having been analyzed or supplemented, then 
later emerged from storage in virtually its original condition, 
on a parallel track, as an all-or-none response to some subse-
quent stimulus. There appear to be no switches or sidings along 
the track which would permit the input to be sorted, segregated, 
redistributed, or integrated with previous or subsequent input 
(1962, p.76). 
In agreement with Rimland we can say that sti-
muli are apprehended but not comprehended. Per-
cepts are stored as molecular fragments and may 
be evoked or re-experienced by specific associa-
tion states or stimuli. 
Rimland further asks himself the question of, 
"where in the brain do incoming stimuli inter-
act with previously stored experience to provide 
meaning to the former and exercise the "raison 
d'etre" for the latter" (1962, p. 78). He 
answers himself by pointing out the function of 
the recticular formation; whose role in percep-
57 
tion will also be of importance in the second 
part of this study. He finds the recticular 
formation suited in terms of anatomical place­
ment, neural structure, and number of neural 
connections to the sense organs and cortex, to 
supply the collaterals and interconnections 
within the normal brain whose functional absence 
in cases of autism could result in the impair­
ment of thought observed. 
Attributing a function as complex as conception 
to the recticular formation involves a high 
degree of speculation. Perceptual phenomena, 
however, lend themselves much more readily to 
such an assumption. For it has been shown that 
sensory stimulation causes impulses to originate 
in the recticular formation and that it can Ъе 
seen to play a vital role in the evocation of 
attention and in the maintenance of alertness. 
It also functions to modulate the sensory ac­
tivities of the receptor organs. These functions 
if impaired may be able to account for the 
autistic child's unalertness or inattention to 
stimuli falling outside of his narrow field of 
observation. This may also offer an explanation 
for his preferential use of the proximal senses, 
touch, taste, and smell, over the more objecti­
fying distal senses, vision and hearing which 
may in turn be seen to limit his ability to 
derive indices of meaning or function from the 
external world. The memory-experience relation . 
that could be formed on this level would.be the 
"resensation of the familiar" type. Lindsley 
points out that there is good reason to believe 
that the recticular formation is essential for 
perception since, "under barbiturate anesthesia 
the recticular formation is the first to go out 
of function, whereas the classical sensory path­
ways are still capable of transmitting messages 
to the cortex where they may be recorded . . . 
These messages seem not to be elaborated or 
integrated and hence are rendered ineffective 
for discriminatory purposes" (l958> P« 51?)· 
Thus we see that without the activating and 
differentiating effects of the recticular for­
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matinn upon the cortex the individual cannot 
adequately perceive or make discriminations. 
Rimland also reports the success achieved in 
using various drugs on autistic children. It 
appears that deanol, a psychic-energizer which 
seemingly facilitates transmission through the 
recticular formation, shows the most promise 
and has been observed to bring improvement to 
the point that the mute autist begins to speak 
and temper tantrums give way to a better dis-
position. It is suggested that the child's 
affective problems may be partially attributable 
to his inability and resulting frustration in 
trying to comprehend and deal with his environ-
ment. 
Most workers in this field have considered 
Kanner's syndrome to be some sort of psychosis 
and not simply a deficiency in cognitive capa-
bilities. Their position has been based on the 
affective disturbances displayed by these 
children. Bleuler as we have noted considered 
one of the most important symptoms of psychosis 
to be the preponderance of inner life with an 
active turning away from the external world. 
This active turning away can be seen to be 
based on and to result in affective disturban-
ces. In these cases autism would be sustained 
through the over emphasis on the inner world 
and the denial of the outer world, distorting 
the bipolar organization of perception. 
If autism is to be seen as a cognitive defi-
ciency which presents affective problems only 
in so far as the child experiences frustration 
in dealing with and trying to master his world 
then it will fall short of explaining all of 
the child's behavior. A deficiency disorder 
would not appear to account for the child's 
seemingly thoughtful detachment, irritability, 
or preoccupied appearance. These behavior traits 
would tend to indicate an active turning toward 
an inner world. 
Rimland focuses attention on the studies done 
on sensory deprivation which point out that an 
environment lacking or deficient in external 
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sensory stimulation modifies the perceptual 
environment to such a degree that a normal per­
sonality can Ъе deformed to the point of dis­
playing psychotic behavior and affective dis­
turbances. Due to the emptiness of the external 
world the inner world dominates. Rimland asks, 
"And what of the child whose sense organs are 
intact, hut whose neural structure does not 
permit stimuli to register?" (1962, p. I04). 
Thus a deficiency disorder involving the rec-
ticular formation might give enough reason for 
believing that the perceptual capabilities of 
the early autist are so severely impaired that 
sensory deprivation psychosis must be considered. 
Individuals having undergone sensory deprivation 
are reported to look at another but never to see 
him and just to stare into space, remaining mute 
and detached. 
Children suffering from retrolental fibroplasia, 
blindness at birth caused by over-oxygenation, 
often show basically the same pattern of symp­
toms as that identified by Kanner as the autistic 
syndrome. These and other indices of the danger 
of oxygen to the brain of the newborn have lead 
Rimland to formulate the hypothesis, "that at 
least in some instances, early infantile autism 
could be caused or very accurately simulated by 
an excess of oxygen given in early infancy" 
(1962, p. 112). 
Following Rimland1s development of his theory 
concerning the genesis of early infantile autism 
now brings us to a crucial point in our line of 
thought. What predisposes certain children 
towards autistic states? Y/e have noted with 
Rimland's help that the unique and specific 
symptomology displayed by those children af­
flicted is as it were counter balanced by the 
unique personality-intelligence configuration 
displayed by their parents. This point has been 
grasped upon to show the tenability of presen­
ting the supposition that predisposition towards 
autistic states may be based upon genetic dis­
positions . 
Now let us see what support we can find for this 
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supposition in the cases of autistic syndromes. 
The parents of children afflicted with early 
infantile autism form a unique intelligent group. 
The task of separating the influences that 
hereditary and environmental factors have on 
intelligence is difficult but most investigators 
attribute roughly 90 percent of variation in 
intelligence to hereditary factors ала 10 per­
cent to environmental influences. Heredity also 
seems to account for the vast differences in 
brain structure at birth. After ал analysis of 
the data common to both parents and the children 
afflicted with Kanner'a syndrome it would not be 
difficult to agree with Rimland that the children, 
"may have in common a specific genetic back­
ground which predisposes them to high intelli­
gence if nothing goes awry" (I962, p. 114). High 
intelligence implies a brain highly efficient in 
integrating experience. 
The striking fact that the demographic profiles 
of children afflicted with Kanner's syndrome 
match those of profiles selected from gifted 
children may lead us to a discovery that dis­
positions toward high intelligence also involve 
dangers. A construction plan for a highly com­
plex apparatus involves the risks that its more 
complex elements may be damaged during its pro­
longed and delicate development or may be more 
sensitive to external influences, which in the 
case of the early autist may include sensitivity 
to oxygen excesses. These points are open to 
further investigation. Another point may be that 
one section of such an apparatus may develop 
beyond the point of being able to find integra­
tion with the other sections. 
The facet of the analysis of Kanner's syndrome 
which holds the most interest for this study 
involves the discerning of perceptual mechanisms 
from the behavioral traits or characteristics 
associated with the unique personality-intelli­
gence configuration formed by the parents of 
these children. The mechanisms discovered will 
be related, in the following part of this study, 
to the general nature of perception and to the 
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factors influencing autistic perception. 
The most typifying characteristics attributed to 
the parents of the autistic child are objectivity 
and unemotionality which in turn suggests a very 
high order of intellectual control over the emo-
tions, following Rimland's line of thought. 
Objectivity further implies that their 'drives 
will be channeled and projected into the future, 
and that their perceptual approach will involve 
an indistractible selectiveness of attention. 
Unemotionality might further imply a preferential 
avoidance of using feelings or emotional reac-
tions as sources of information; levels of emo-
tional responsivity have a high genetic com-
ponent. A high degree of emotional control would 
require a brain capable of very accurate ap-
praisal of present experience in relation to 
past experience. The ready availability of past 
experience together with the sharpness of pre-
sent perception could tend to keep affective 
response inhibited. Rimland feels that the 
specific personality configuration of these 
parents may result largely from their ready 
availability of emotion-inhibiting remembered 
experience. The neural mechanism which permits 
this control in the parents seems to be precisely 
the one impaired in the child. Here it is of 
interest to repeat Rimland's citation of an old 
paper by Kahen and Cohen: 
The over- as well aa the under-development of certain brain areas 
serves as a sort of background of certain positive and negative 
members of the species, or in other »orda, of certain superior 
and deficient types . . . . We ape of the opinion that there 
exist personality types which owe their existence, at least 
partially, to special organization of the brainstem (1934, p.78). 
The implications that these ideas for the per-
ceptual process will be discussed shortly in the 
second part of this study. 
It may also well be that the high degree of drive 
and achievement noted in this group of parents 
could ]be related to a high amount of free energy 
available for cathexis of new stimulation which 
in turn will determine the degree of articulation 
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characterizing individual fixations of attention. 
The individual with a great amount of free neu-
tralized energy could perceive new stimulation 
with a degree of vividness that in itself leads 
to superior learning and recall. It is possible 
that our previous notation of the nature and 
strength of "activity-affect" as a hereditary 
disposition may he related to the individual 
variations in degree of activation. Also the 
intensity of attention would determine the degree 
of selectiveness and the level of distractibility. 
Another factor which will be open for examina-
tion in the following part of this study is the 
tendency to narrow awareness and to keep expe-
riences discrete. 
This examination and analization of the very 
significant theoretical advances made by Rimland 
in his study of Kanner1s syndrome has brought us 
to the stage where we will advance further sup-
positions concerning perceptual modes or patterns 
as characteristics of individual organisms. 
Rimland's exposition of Kanner·s syndrome as a 
deficiency disorder embedded in a particular 
gpnetic constitutional field has made us attent 
to the fact that the intellectual, emotional, 
and motivational behavior displayed by a group 
of individuals who show a specific personality 
configuration may aid us in discerning the 
nature of the adaptive approach implied in the 
genetic construction of their organisms. This 
type of approach may help us not only to divest 
the problems surrounding abnormal mentality from 
their shrouds but may also aid us in discovering 
new insights into man's personality and his 
modes of relatedness to his world. 
The major purpose of this present study is to 
further analize the human position indentified 
by the term "autistic perception" with the aim 
of presenting further suppositions regarding 
mans organizational dispositions and the in-
fluence that they exert on his perception and 
knowledge of himself and the other. 
Before we enter into this suppositional world it 
may be wise if we acquaint ourselves somewhat 
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more thoroughly with the distinctions that can 
he seen and drawn between various autistic syn-
dromes. This will be the purpose of Chapter 
three. 
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CHAPTER III 
Differentiating Autistic Syndromes 
As has already been noted Kanner's syndrome of 
early infantile autism is considered Ъу many 
writers to be a form of childhood schizophrenia. 
Others consider it to be an apart type of psy­
chosis or to be confounded by oligophrenia. It 
must be confessed at once that part of the pro­
blem may lie in what can be included under the 
term "autistic". This term is generally applied 
to behavioral manifestations of extreme with­
drawal which appear to involve mental preoccupa­
tion with an inner world. The looseness with 
which this term can be applied often leads to 
more confusion than clarity. 
Let us consider the differences in symptomology 
between Kanner's syndrome and childhood schi­
zophrenia and then attempt to see if we can find 
a basic element which we could agree to call 
autistic. 
In contrast to what we have learned of the 
symptomology connected with Kanner's syndrome 
we learn that the diagnosis of childhood schi­
zophrenia is given when it is observed that dis­
ordered behavior follows an initial period of 
normal development in which emotional contact 
is present. Further the schizophrenic child is 
characterized by respiratory, metabolic and or 
other general health disturbances which do not 
appear in the significantly healthy children 
described by Kanner as early autists. The 
schizophrenic child has been found to be very 
easy to condition while Anthony notes the 
difficulty in establishing conditioning and the 
speed of extinction in early autistic children. 
The electroencephalograph recordings of more 
than seventy-five percent of schizophrenic 
children show disturbances while most cases of 
Kanner's syndrome show no disturbances. The 
autist is found to be stiff as a board when 
picked up and isolated from social contact while 
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the schizophrenic molds himself to the other 
"both in posture and empathy. The families of 
early autist show very low incidence of mental 
illness while schizophrenia shows a very marked 
familial connection with a higher than average 
rate of psychosis in the stock. The schizophrenic 
child further appears to come from a strife 
ridden family from the lower socioeconomic level. 
The early autist is not reported to experience 
the auditory and visual hallucinations or delu­
sions common to schizophrenia. 
The most graphic manner of describing these 
differences is to say that the schizophrenic 
child shows disorientation marked by anxiety and 
concern while the autistic child is unoriented, 
alone, and detached rather than rejecting. 
These behavioral manifestations appear to argue 
for very little similarity between Kanner1s syn­
drome and childhood schizophrenia but if we con­
dense both of their perceptual and conceptual 
deficiencies they appear to be on a similar 
level. For while the early infantile autist dis­
plays a basic inability to relate sensation with 
experience, resulting in a very narrow range of 
associations with molecular memory fragments. 
The schizophrenic child's arrested level of ab­
straction is theorized by Rimland to be due to 
associational connections being made too freely, 
perhaps even at times randomly so that he may be 
seen as pathologically "unrestrained by rele­
vance" in making associations. He further feels 
that, "one might say that in the autistic child 
the recticular formation is essentially non­
functioning, while in the schizophrenic child 
the reticular formation is malfunctioning" (1962, 
p. НУ)· The differences in symptomology between 
Kanner's syndrome and child schizophrenia appear 
to reflect differences in the manner in which 
stimuli are associated with memory. 
Norman points out that the perceptual persevera­
tion found in schizophrenic children, "-the lack 
of fading of impressions/plays its part not only 
in their concrete and particular and obsessive 
ways of thought but also in the failure in the 
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integration of objects and of themselves, which 
leaves them handicapped in the real world and 
comparatively helpless in the world of their own 
fantasy" (1954> P· 139)· The problem appears to 
be generated by a defective "filtering" process 
which would when properly functioning sort out 
irrelevant stimuli which should Ъе inhibited or 
extinguished. 
The hallucinations experienced by schizophrenics 
appear to be another example of perceptual over-
response. It is also notable that hallucinations 
are usually in the auditory and visual realms; 
Those mediators which objectify most hut require 
relation to past experience for meaning. Here 
again if we apply Rimland's hypothesized func­
tion for the reticular formation that of tying 
sensation to memory we would find over associa­
tion connected with malfunction as in the schi­
zophrenic and dysfunction or partial blockage of 
nerve impulses to accentuate the other senses 
which is true of autism. 
The genesis of schizophrenia is still not clear 
but there is a great deal of evidence which 
points towards genetical determination. The role 
of environmental stress on a sensitive pre-dis-
position cannot be ignered and a great deal of 
research in psychopharmacology has resulted in 
drugs which aid the schizophrenic in inhibiting 
his associations. 
The disorientated behavior of the schizophrenic 
child and the unorientated behavior of the child 
identified by Kanner's syndrome suggest a bipolar 
continuum of manners of associations of stimuli 
with past experience based upon genetical dis­
positions towards certain brain stem configura­
tions. The term "autistic" may then be seen to 
describe a state of orientation distortion cha­
racterized by under or over association of 
stimuli with experience. 
47 
INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
A VIEW OF AUTISTIC PERCEPTION 
The preceding chapters have formed a condensa-
tion and minor elaboration of both clinical and 
experimental conceptions regarding autistic . 
states and syndrome. The dominant characteristics 
of autistic states and perception, as identified 
in both the laboratory and clinic, have been 
discussed and then augmented by a consideration 
of the respective roles of hereditary, biological, 
and environmental factors in normal development 
and in the formation of autistic states. The 
specificity of the symptomology found in Kanner's 
syndrome along with the specificity of the paren-
tal personality-intelligence configuration has 
brought to attention the balance between beha-
vioral characteristics and genetic perceptual 
and cognitive dispositions. 
It appears then that it may be possible, through 
an analysis of the particular patterns and cha-
racteristics of intellectual, emotional, and 
motivational behavior displayed by a group of 
individuals who show a specific personality con-
figuration, to discern the nature of the adaptive 
approach implied in the genetic construction of 
the organism. Several perceptual and cognitive 
patterns were identified as characteristic of 
the personality-intelligence configuration formed 
by the group of parents identified by Kanner. 
Also Rimland's suppositions were advanced, con-
cerning their relation to neural and genetic 
patterns. Further analysis of the cognitive and 
perceptual deficiencies common to early infantile 
autism and childhood schizophrenia has suggested 
the postulation of a bipolar continuum of geneti-
cal predispositions toward neural manners of 
association of stimuli with past experience. 
Theoretically, positions along this continuum 
would then suggest varying dispositions toward 
states of orientation distortion or autistic 
perception and thought. 
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It has long Ъееп recognized that individuals 
vary in their behavioral reactions to the same 
environmental situation. This variability may be 
due to the nature of past experiences and their 
consequent influences on the individual or due 
to the individual's manner of structuring or 
perceiving the information that he obtains 
through his modes of relation with the world. 
The paradox of the nature-nurture issue presents 
the most challenging of problems. The problem 
may appear differently if we do not try to 
account for some characteristics as genetically 
determined while considering others to be wholly 
environmentally determined. If we follow the 
words of Murphy noted in our introduction, we 
find that the organism does not adapt itself to 
the environment; the environment adapts the 
organism to itself. 
The daily life in a clinic acquaints one with 
the picture that some organisms enter life under 
so large a handicap that no matter how rich their 
later environment may be it cannot make them 
what they have no potentiality to become. The 
child in school may be seen as receiving so many 
doses of knowledge per day, which he accumulates 
or he may be seen as unfolding a potential for 
knowledge under stimulating circumstances, which 
frees him to gain further knowledge. V/hen we are 
forced to ask how it is that each child in the 
same class seems to learn different things and 
to various degrees of accuracy then we might be 
able to say that each child receives or struc­
tures information differently. The environment 
may be full of activity and distractions or 
enpty but we still note individual sensitivities 
to either condition. When we can observe groups 
of individuals who show the same behavioral cha­
racteristics and then also find similar genetic 
backgrounds then we can strengthen our supposi­
tions. The mechanisms that we can generalize 
from their similarities aid us in describing and 
understanding their modes of functioning, which 
in turn aid us in understanding other individuals. 
If we view perception as a process mediating 
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sense reception with action involving an act of 
structuring stimulation in such a way that an 
alteration in the structure of the perceived 
world takes place; then this act may further Ъе 
seen as an aspect of a series of acts in a per­
ceptual-cognitive act of confronting, coping 
with, orientating and reacting in respect to the 
perceived world. The process of perception in­
volves interaction with memories, judgements, 
motivations and leads into thought which sub­
sequently influences perception. 
The purpose of this part of the study is to 
analize the perceptual act in its various phases 
and to present certain propositions regarding 
dispositional manners of structuring sense recep­
tion which may be seen to influence the beha­
vioral reactions to the perceived world. A fur­
ther attempt will be made to relate certain 
manners of perceptual organization to certain 
neural configurations. Lastly suppositions will 
be developed regarding the development of genetic 
organizational dispositions toward autistic per­
ception. This section of the study is admittedly 
of a speculative nature but as an attempt to 
present a cohesive statement of man's genetic-
biological-psychological existence it is felt 
that it warrants consideration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Perception as Process and Act 
A. The perceptual act. 
Following Solley and Murphy (i960) perceiving 
may be seen as a psychological process with 
isomorphical parallel physiological events, which 
is extended in time and consists of a series of 
interdependent subprocesses, or stages of an act 
which can be partially ordered in their succes-
sion. 
The first stage defined in their exposition is 
preparatory in nature and involves states of 
perceptual expectancy before stimulation. The 
human organism seeks or searches for specific 
forms of stimulation related to its modes of 
receptivity and to its anticipations from past 
experience. Each sensory reaction prepares a set 
for another and informs of other states. Each 
motoric response of the newborn infant refines 
his ultimate modes of action which bring him into 
contact with his goals which in turn builds and 
reaffirms new modes of organization and expex-
tancies. In time and through development and or-
ganization perceptual expectancies may grow to 
reflect basically the same amount of information 
as is contained in the thing represented; the 
individual may develop maps of expectable per-
ceptual events in his environment. These maps 
roughly acquaint him with what the future might 
bring and direct his searching behavior. The 
affective qualityof our encounters with the 
environment also structures our expectancies; so 
that we might observe that our businessman trying 
t« read through borrowed glasses might structure 
his percepts in accordance with his expectations. 
Activity, purpose, and expectancy are interlinked 
factors present in any perception. 
Perhaps we can see the smile of the five-week-
old infant as expressing expectancy, ffe see, 
hear, and listen selectively according to our 
expectancies or assumption sets. Our perceptual 
patterns of expectancy form schematic frames of 
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reference into which sensory input is organized. 
Memorie traces form cognitive schemata with 
which new data are matched without which percep­
tion is aphasie in that sensory phenomena are 
sensed without meaning. 
The second stage in perceiving involves the 
attentive-preparatory search the "moment before 
and during" reception of a potential perceptual 
stimulus. Apprehension or registration of stimu­
lation is insufficient for perception which re­
quires the attention of the perceiver. Expecta­
tions whether innate, motivated, or intentional 
direct a search for specific sources of stimula­
tion, which implies an investment of energy. 
Solley вла Murphy state that, "As an act, atten­
tion is a) selective, (h) integrative, and (c) 
energie. Each of these aspects of the attentional 
act serves the purpose of controlling stimula­
tion, either by producing new stimulation, by 
focusing upon stimulus sources to maximize sti­
mulation from the sources, or by amplifying what­
ever stimulation is present ала active" (i960, 
p. 178). 
The selective mechanism involved in deploying 
attention may in some ways be considered innate 
for the organism must be able to give priority 
to the structuring of some forms of stimulation 
over the sea of others simply on the basis of 
survival value. Attending would then involve an 
act of selection among competing components, the 
establishment of dominance relations, and the 
ultimate transition to new components. 
The individual is selective both in his search 
for specific stimulation which is guided by his 
expectations and energetically directed by his 
motives and also in his attending to the sought 
for stimulus for he inhibits all other percep­
tual acts which are not directly relèvent to his 
purpose. Within the attentional sphere there are 
also degrees of awareness, alertness, or selec-
tion of stimuli so that a process of ordering 
with respect to the range of attending can be 
identified and seen as a mechanism of focusing 
which controls the sharpness of perception of 
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detail to whele. Integration on the latter level 
would be found on the hierarchial order of the 
system and is achieved on another level Ъу the 
formation of contiguity of stimulation through 
successive acts of attending searching, scanning, 
and shifting of perception. 
The degree of concentration of attention is seen 
to be related to the level of awareness or dis­
crimination of the percept due to the level of 
energy deployment. Concentration on one object 
of attention implies inhibition of other areas 
of activity. 
Solley and Murphy (i960) express the view that 
besides attention becoming conditioned it is 
possible that individuals learn to deploy or 
anchor available energy in characteristic pat­
terns which would bind some energy to certain 
specific sources of stimulation. Gardner and 
his associates (i960) provide evidence that 
adults may be consistently different in their 
strategies of attention deployment, which will 
be considered in more detail later. 
Perceptual expectation was the first molar unit 
that we observed in the perceptual act; it was 
noted to begin before stimulation and to merge 
with the second preparatory phase of attending 
or search both of which continue after merging 
into our third molar unit reception or sensory 
reactions. This stage of the perceptual process 
involves the reception and channeling of stimu­
lation through the organism's intraorganic world 
of receptors and projection areas all of which 
in their particular and characteristic interre­
lations provide the content of perception. The 
functioning of these factors are influenced by 
proper development and the effects of repeated 
experience upon the receiving of stimuli. This 
stage flows into and continues with the follow­
ing molar unit which involves the brief delay 
in time between reception of stimulation and the 
final structuring of a percept. 
This interval is filled with the immense activity 
of structuring the tentative assumptions and 
sensory input into a structured percept. This 
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analyzing and synthesizing process is termed 
trial-and-check by Solley and Murphy (i960) 
following Woodworth's earlier description of 
this process. Trial-and-check is a two-phase pro-
cess involving first the trial or testing of a 
tentative characterization of the stimulus si-
tuation against the background of the dominant 
memorie schemata immediately followed by the 
check phase of positive or negative acceptance 
and reinforcement of the tentative perception. 
The early stages of development are characterized 
by this trial-and-check process of perceptual 
learning which involves the articulation of pre-
sent incoming information against the already-
developing schemata of expectancies and memory 
traces. Perception is a search for the meaning 
of the moment in the light of past experience 
and future expectations. If meaning cannot be 
readily attributed to the sensory moment in the 
light of the past then further search and trials 
are stimulated by this need for meaning and 
guided by an internal adjustment towards better 
receptivity. If meaning is found in a tentative 
characterization it is reinforced through inte-
gration or assimilation with a dominant memory 
schemata. We could say that we learn to give 
meaning to what our nervous system is doing for 
meaning accrues from the dimensions of sensory 
conditions and structure imposed on the organism 
through specific stimulation. It is highly 
possible that our expectancies function to de-
termine meaning while our acts of attention 
function to determine the sensory dimensionality 
of our perception. 
Perception conceived of as a function of exter-
nal sources of stimulation belies the importance 
of the proprioceptive and interoceptive signals 
which direct our encounter and perception of the 
external world. The phase of trial-and-check is 
paralleled by a phase involving the feedback of 
autonomic and proprioceptive signals within the 
organism. The hand searches to make available to 
the skin receptors the most information. The pro-
cess of scanning may be seen as the key to this 
54 
matter for it involves the aiming of our atten-
tional sensitivities toward either exteroceptive 
cues or proprioceptive, interoceptive, or memcrdc 
cues which further direct the operation of scan­
ning towards that which is congruent with the 
dominant set, expectancy, or anticipation and 
excludes that which is not relevant. 
Solley and Murphy conclude that, "Attention 
moves toward that which it seeks, comes to rest 
momentarily when that which it seeks is found" 
and that, "Autism would Ъе an instance of scan­
ning or attention operating in such a way as to 
use those cues, especially interoceptive, pro­
prioceptive, and memorie cues, . . . which may 
and often do override the evidence of present 
exteroceptive sources" (i960, p. 255)· They fur­
ther feel that autistic trends might be reduced 
Ъу training in the use of external and internal 
scanning processes which would reveal the cha­
racter of the exteroceptive, interoceptive, or 
memorie cues interfering with good reality tes­
ting. This might amount to destroying old sets 
and 'conditioning Ъу estahlishing new and more 
adequate sets such as are done in courses for 
remedial reading and speech disturbances. Thus 
the reality determining balance between ex­
teroceptive, proprioceptive, interoceptive, and 
memorie cues might be strengthened and thus cor­
rected against autism by more sharply defining 
the exteroceptive cues. As has been suggested 
autism is at its crest when a mass of relevant 
sensory material is effectively excluded as it 
may well be in the condition of early infantile 
autism. Over emphasis of proprioceptive or in­
teroceptive feedback may also lead to faulty 
modes of utilization of available cues. It is 
necessary to consider that the cumulative effects 
of previous feedback responses may adapt the 
physiological mechanism to a new level or esta­
blish sets of readiness to respond. Many investi­
gators have discovered the relation between muscu­
lar tensions and manners of action and perception. 
The best possible type of perception would in­
volve a balance of recognition and discrimination 
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of cues from both the inner and external world. 
It is also possible that styles of deploying 
attention, and of investing energy reflect cog­
nitive systems which guide individuals in their 
perception-environment adjustments and assimila­
tions. 
The fifth and last stage of the perceptual pro­
cess, as conceived Ъу Solley arid Murphy, is the 
consolidation of a sample of stimulus traces 
into a structured percept. The consolidations 
include all effective autonomic, proprioceptive, 
and exteroceptive traces. Repeated experiences 
will consolidate more and more samples. This 
last phase of the process also involves the deri­
vation of meanings. Primary meanings involve 
innate differentiations of sensory events, per­
cepts, and responses which are based on the in­
dividual's biological inheritance. Through 
learning experiences, new habits of differen­
tiating sensory, perceptual, and motor acts are 
acquired and are based upon the primary meanings. 
An excellent summation of this process is given 
by Boring and recounted by Solley and Murphy 
(i960, p. 510)· I"t involves the successive dif­
ferentiations within the individual between re­
ception of a stimulus and overt behavior. Fol­
lowing the reception of a stimulus, the indi­
vidual differentiates, to varying degrees, the 
stimulation qualities according to the extent 
and manner that the individual's nervous system 
facilitates. The results of this differentiation 
are transmitted, most likely as difference 
values, into the following system where these 
difference values are integrated into systems 
of perceptual, memorie, and conceptual units; 
new differentiations follow between these units. 
Again difference values are formed and transmit­
ted and integrated into the units of the poten­
tial behavior system where response are diffe­
rentiated in incipient form. The difference 
values of this process are integrated into some 
final set of values which will form a response 
hierarchy. Each of these points of differentia­
tion and integration represents a node of an 
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organized meaning system. This implies that 
meanings are successive parts of an open system 
expressing dissimilar relations between succes-
sive nodes. Each node of meaning will feedback 
upon its predecessor and will govern to a certain 
extent the subsequent differentiations within 
the prior nodes. 
Meanings will differ according to the extent of 
differentiation and integration at the node of 
the preceding system. A wristwatch may be per-
ceived differently by the man who owns it and 
the watchmaker who has made it. Also the beha-
vioral consequences of the owner's attempts to 
diagnose his own watch will result in less dif-
ferentiation of stimuli differences than when 
the watchmaker explores for the purpose of diag-
nosis and therapy. Behavioral or motor success 
govern the manner of stimuli sampling. That 
which is rewarded is more likely to be seen as 
figure against the ground of other or unrewarding 
stimuli. The level of behavioral meaning will 
depend upon perceptual differentiation and inte-
gration and will structure the level of sensory 
search. Further meaning is only present when the 
differentiation of the preceding system has im-
plication for the following system. Thus if sen-
sory differentiation has no implications for 
possible perceptual or motor differentiation 
then it is meaningless. 
The molar components of the perceptual act can 
thus be conceptualized, following Solley and 
Murphy (i960) as following the sequence: expec-
tation of stimulation-,—» attending- >recep-
tion .. -^  trial-and-check, along with autonomic 
and proprioceptive arousal and feedback—* final 
structuring, particularly along natural lines 
such as figure-ground articulation. It is also 
possible to agree with their further formulation 
that the act of perceiving is an organismic 
response whose fundamental dynamics, including 
learning, should be relatable with the acquisi-
tion of overt behavioral acts. This type of view 
relates perceptual learning to motor learning 
which it precedes and instigates through its 
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defining of the available possihlities. Follo­
wing this line of thought brings us into contact 
with a living system which learns through orga-
nismic adaptations of which perception is ал 
initial phase of structuring which is then ela­
borated and continued through central or cogni­
tive and motor differentiations. 
Before we attempt to integrate what patterns of 
expectancies, modes of deploying free energy and 
differentiations of levels of meaning may imply 
for the individual in his relation to his en­
vironment let us first see if we can discern 
what nature of biological organization lies 
behind these traits. 
B. Biological basis of perception. 
From all that we have thus far considered we are 
lead to search for biological mechanisms which 
can account for the levels of organization, inte­
gration, and coordination displayed in human be­
havior. The states of disturbed integration that 
have been considered also graphically illustrate 
that we must attempt to discover those types of 
regulatory activity which when adequate would 
account first for selective thought, or the 
ability to focus conscious attention upon a 
single thought or idea at a time thus establish­
ing orderly progression of significant associa­
tions; and secondly those activities which result 
in emotional association or relation of idea and 
affect in a harmonious manner. The latter in turn 
sets us searching for a common integrating me­
chanism for those two units. Such a mechanism 
would be most likely to operate within and accor­
ding to the manner of regulation seen in the cen­
tral homeostatic apparatus of the organism - the 
hypothalamic - endocrine axis. The nature of 
these functions would further require that the 
mechanism arise in the diencephalon and project 
into the higher cortical centers. 
Many investigations of the human cerebral cortex 
have led to the conclusion that the anterior 
frontal "association areas" are not silent as was 
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previously thought "but rather function in connec-
tion with the abilities to abstract, plan, and 
employ social judgement. It is only within recent 
times that the areas of function connected with 
affective experience have been localized and 
identified. The well known comparative studies 
of Herrick suggested that the rhinencephalon 
serves also as a nonspecific activator for all 
cortical activities, exercising appropriate in-
hibitory or excitatory influence on such func-
tions as memory learning, and affective behavior. 
This may be seen to augment Papez's earlier pro-
posal that the archipallial structures might be 
seen as the mediators of emotional experience. 
Mac Lean's later comments on the limbic system 
point out its interpretation of experience in 
terms of quality and intensity which he feels 
may account for the varying intensities and 
qualities of experience that are associated with 
emotional feeling, also it appears that the 
various internal and external senses are repre-
sented in this system. He states, "As a working 
hypothesis, it can be inferred that the limbic 
system is for the "body viscus" a visceral brain 
that interprets and gives expression to its in-
coming information in terms of feeling, being 
incapable perhaps of getting at the meaning of 
things at the level of symbolic language" (1952). 
Penfield has concluded from his research that 
anatomical relationships imply a particularly 
close association of the frontal, anterior, and 
limbic cortex with a centrencephalic integrating 
system. He uses the term "centrencephalic" to 
refer to "that system within diencephalon, 
mesencephalon and probably rhombencephalon which 
has bilateral functional connections with both 
cerebral hemispheres" (1950). 
At this time other investigators distinguished 
two functional elements within the central-reti-
cular formation of the brain system. The lateral 
element involves the traditional specific sen-
sory afferent paths while the more medial element 
involves a series of ascending relays which func-
tion to maintain the waking state. Jasper further 
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demonstrated that this system not only acts as 
a "center of consciousness" but that while the 
specific and diffuse systems were independent, 
there was a fundamental interaction between them 
mediated by way of a feedback circuit. He feels 
that the diffuse system is responsible for the 
secondary elaborations of impulses reaching the 
cortex via the specific systems and that it 
exerts "a regulatory or integrating effect on 
these elaborations" (1950). 
If we once again view man as an adaptive orga-
nism operating according to the principle of 
homeostasis then perhaps we can consider the 
mechanisms mentioned as following from an origi-
nal visceral consciousness, which by virtue of 
an emotional awareness, served to forecast the 
success or failure of a particular environmental 
object in satisfying the inner needs. But also 
visual, auditory, and somesthetic imagery pro-
jected from the thalamus to the limbic cortex 
became capable of conditioning an associated emo-
tional response from the contiguous archipallium. 
Now, predictions can be made on the potential 
success or failure of a proposed behavioral ac-
tivity in satisfying the organism's adaptational 
needs. The "proper" pattern of behavior would be 
chosen on the basis of the most "favorable" emo-
tional response and translated into activity. 
With the development of the neocortex much more 
flexibility became possible. A rational sphere 
of consciousness was elaborated which permitted 
the use of abstract symbols which greatly ex-
panded the chances of adaptational success. This 
new capacity instigates greater accuracy of dif-
ferentiation and more productive synthesis. 
These new functions remain superimposed over the 
more primary determinants of behavior and con-
tinue to communicate with each other and with 
the archipallium through the centrencephalic 
system. Rosenzweig states: "We may venture that 
the limbic, or rhinencephalic, cortex exerted a 
regulatory effect on percept-concept-idea elabo-
ration. The relationship appears to be essential 
and reciprocal, and mediated by way of the feed-
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back circuits of the nonspecific projection sy­
stem. This mechanism, with its integrative and 
organizing functions, could make up the essence 
of what we have come to regard as the ego" 
(1955, P. 550). 
This type of phylogenetic development might Ъе 
seen to recapitulate itself in individual matu-
rational development. Thus the adaptive behavior 
of the newborn may be considered to begin its 
development from a primary reflex level. Followed 
by the development of rhinencephalic mechanisms 
expressed in the infant's primary attention to 
visceral needs and through his oral mode of re­
lation with the external world, which in turn 
may herald the coupling of primary imagery with 
affective experience - primary thought. Beha-
viorally he will first reject ала then avoid 
those stmuli whose percepts are associated with 
unpleasant affect. He will then develop the 
ability to differentiate between the environmen­
tal stimuli transmitted through nonvisceral re­
ceptor pathways and he is noted to look listen 
and touch as often as he mouths. His attention 
will first be held by small details while later 
he will synthesize these delimited stimuli until 
he can respond to whole objects. Thought remains 
at the primary "imagery-emotion" or archipallial 
level for some time which allows him to relate 
to his object world only according to the affect 
engendered by the total percept. Affect is now 
experienced on a continuum of security-anxiety. 
The external world is still regarded as an ex­
tension of himself due to the emotional nature 
of his mode of operation. He can differentiate 
his percepts on the basis of affective experience 
but is still unable to identify or correlate 
them. 
Ego differentiation may be seen as related to 
the development of neocortical dominance. The 
stimuli received still trigger the affective 
response at the archipallial level but are now 
transmitted to the neocortex where receptor 
centers for the auditory, visual, and somesthe-
tic modalities permit more exact definition of 
61 
percepts. Contiguous areas make elaborations of 
these stimuli possible so that incoming messages 
may be classified and distinctions can be made 
Ъetween members of the same group. In addition 
individual, as well as class, percepts may Ъе 
recalled through a secondary elaboration which 
immensely increases the predictive efficiency of 
adaptive behavior. 
Analysis can now be carried on at a higher level 
through the intercommunication of receptor and 
elaboration centers by way of the multitude of 
associational pathways. This in turn makes pos­
sible the correlation of information from all 
sensory modalities which results in a dimen-
sionally orientated level of concept formation. 
Normally it is only those stimuli transmitted Ъу 
the exteroceptive apparatus which undergo such 
meocortical elaboration. Enteroceptive stimuli 
continue to be dealt with by the limbic brain. 
The distinctions between the apperceptive quali­
ties of these two systems aids in the demarca­
tion of stimuli as internal or external which 
leads to the differentiation of a concept of 
self as apart from the external environment. 
The advent of language marks a new dimension in 
the level of thought. Speech appears to depend 
on the ability to differentiate sounds in a 
highly specific way, together with the develop­
ment of an associational relationship between 
the given sound and a specific concept. With 
development in language words may replace imageiy 
and be used in place of the concept. Ideas may 
now be utilized to facilitate predictive beha­
vior, which permits long-term planning and so­
cial judgement. Ideas may now serve as stimuli, 
and abstractions can be made without reference 
to percepts. 
As Rosenzweig states: 
It would seem, however, that a relationship continues to operate 
between the newer and the older brain which apparently serves 
two major purposes with regard to adaptive behavior: On the one 
hand, it permits information regarding inner needs (enteroceptive 
stimuli, "instinctive drives") to reach neocortical awareness 
.and to be dealt with more efficiently on an ideational level. 
62 
On the other hand, it allows for a cross check (with the frontal 
lobes) of the predictive behavior at the ideational level; i.e., 
it regulates or guides ideational activity away from anxiety-
provoking patterns (1955» P· 551)· 
This relationship can thus be seen as reciprocal, 
and the evidence seems to indicate that the cen-
trencephalic system provides this relationship 
through its feedback circuits. This mechanism 
appears to represent the principle of emotional 
association. 
The function of "consciousness" appears to be 
mediated by the reticular formation in the cen-
trencephalic system, and this system acting as a 
regulator of feed-back may differentially inhibit 
or stimulate into consciousness patterns of cere-
bral activity-the principle of selective thought. 
It is now of interest to observe how this theore-
tical system formulated by Rosenzweig might 
operate. It would begin with a stimulus being 
transmuted along a specific pathway which in 
turn sets up activation in the reticular system 
and projection along the specific and diffuse 
systems. At each step, the information concerning 
this sequential and combinational activation is 
relayed by corticofugal fibers to the centren-
cephalic system where each of these activation 
patterns activates in turn an affective response 
in the archipallium, in keeping with previous 
conditioning of either constitutional or memorie 
nature. The original stimulus pattern, at the 
same time, produces a state of unrest or rever-
berating activity within the limbic system, main-
tained by input from the centrencephalic system. 
Feedback from the neocortex to the centrencepha-
lic system indicates various temporal and spatial 
configurations of activity within the cortex due 
to the elaboration of the stimulus. These mes-
sages would be projected to the limbic system 
where they would be scanned for the effects of 
their "affective tone" on the state of unrest. 
These effects would be transmuted through the 
centrencephalic system to the cortex as facilita-
tory or inhibitory impulses which would modify 
further cortical activity. The patterns facili-
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tated would undergo further elaboration and 
transmission to the centrencephalic system, with 
final reinforcement resulting in probable en-
trance into conscious awareness. This may act, 
in turn, as a new stimulus which would subse-
quently be scanned for meaning after the same 
manner. Those patterns suffering inhibitation 
fade out. 
Rosenzweig concludes that the centrencephalic 
system appears to be the mechanism by which 
homeostasis is maintained within the brain. He 
feels that it also contributes to the homeosta-
sis of the organism as a whole by regulating the 
analytic and synthetic activity of the brain 
through developing patterns of behavior based 
on predictions of outcome as determined from 
past experience which leads, in turn, to effec-
tive adaptation. He postulates the presence of 
a disturbance in the centrencephalic system to 
account for the primary symptoms of schizophre-
nia. 
ffe can perhaps agree then that expectancy or the 
inner needs displayed by the older brain deter-
mine perceptual meaning but let us for the mo-
ment further consider the important role of at-
tention in determining the sensory dimensiona-
lity of perception. Lindsley presents signifi-
cant evidence that stimulation of certain sites 
on the cortex gives rise to evoked potentials 
in the reticular formation which in turn shows 
different latencies for different cortical areas. 
This can be seen to provide a differential basis 
for understanding the mechanisms of attention 
and conditioning. It also appears that the in-
volvement of the reticular system with neuroen-
docrine functions may show it as having an im-
portant energizing function. It has also been 
observed that stimulation of the reticular for-
mation can reduce reaction time to a visual sti-
mulus in humans as well as modify perceptual 
duration and consolidation. Lindsley reports 
that on waking the reticular system imposes an 
alpha rhythm upon the cells but when further 
activated causes a desynchronization of the 
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rhythmic beat due to differentiation or frac-
tionation of the total population of cortical 
units. He sees this differentiation as possibly 
based upon past experience and learned patterns, 
which through the frequent association of certain 
units beating in aggregates make those patterns 
more likely to occur again; such patterns could 
also, however, be based upon innate organization. 
Reticular stimulation probably works more to 
interrupt and reset the rhythms of such organi-
zation than to determine the patterns of corti-
cal organization. This ability would seem of 
vital importance in ensuring that increments of 
new information can be admitted to that already 
existing. If this were not possible behavior 
would fall into a completely rigid pattern and 
learning and adaptation would not be possible. 
Lindsley remarks, "The reticular system is in a 
unique position to monitor all incoming sensory 
messages, and at the same time appears to be 
able to quickly affect an interruption in all 
cortical activities . . . by arousal or general 
alerting mechanisms. Through its connections 
with the thalamus, specific alerting may be ef-
fected, which may be limited to a given percep-
tual modality" (1958, p. 519). 
Other studies have also shown that experimental 
lesions in the reticular formations of cats 
simulate with striking accuracy the symptoms of 
children afflicted with early infantile autism. 
The animals having lateral lesions in the upper-
brainstem became very indistractible, displayed 
stereotype behavior, showed no facial expres-
sion, became mute, and unaffectionate. 
Penfield and Miller (195S) have indicated that 
the hippocampus is an important reservoir of 
memory traces and it appears to mediate learned 
aspects of emotional behavior, while the amyg-
dala may be seen to mediate or control emotional 
responses of an unlearned nature. These func-
tions might be seen to be seriously handicapped 
enough under dysfunction or malfunction of the 
reticular system to account for some of the 
affective disturbance found in severe autistic 
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states. 
Anyone who has attempted to do systematic re­
search on the level of personality analysis is 
acquainted with the difficulties involved in 
trying to find uniform characteristics or pat­
terns of traits across any given sample of 
people. When we are further met with the indi­
vidual variations in reaction ала level of dis­
turbance encountered in normal individuals who 
have undergone sensory deprivation experiences 
г war trauma we find that our descriptive ad­
jectives become disposition towards, mode of 
adaptation, behavior tendencies, and if all else 
fails - neurotic tendencies. 
We have to this point examined the act of per­
ception and a probable biological basis for this 
process; the subtlety and complexity of this 
isomorphical system leave us much space to dis­
cuss personal differences in perception but our 
purpose is not to emphasize the differences 
which abound but rather the patterns which they 
form through their interaction. Can we account 
for dispositions, modes of adaptation, behavior 
tendencies and if necessary neurotic tendencies? 
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CHAPTER V 
The Individual as Perceiver 
A new Ъогп ЪаЪу can at best Ъе said to have a 
potential personality; that is certain capaci­
ties and characteristics are almost bound to 
develop. He can perhaps be seen to attain a per­
sonality as that form of adaptation most suitable 
to his particular needs within a particular en­
vironmental framework. It is then a system com­
posed of an "inside structure" embedded within 
and interacting with "outside structures". From 
examinations of which structure imposes what 
influence on the system it appears that the in­
dividual's innate neural and glandular equipment 
contribute more to his intelligence, temperament, 
and physique than they will to his ideological 
or cultural conformity. Some of the aspects of 
personality are then more, and some less subject 
to environmental influence. \7e learn certain 
things more easily than others because of genetic 
facilitation. Personality may be further seen as 
structured through tendencies toward particular 
directions of activity or associations that are 
called sets, dispositions, preferred patterns, 
attitudes, or personal characteristics. 
Allport finds that, "A personal disposition is 
a generalized neuropsychic structure (peculiar 
to the individual), with the capacity to render 
many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to 
initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms 
of adaptive behavior" (I96I, p. 573)· Using this 
type of formulation we might agree with him that 
the human mind operates as it does principally 
because it is replete with "sets" or disposi­
tions. 
These sets or dispositions are indispensable in 
discussing perception for it illustrates that 
our ability to adapt to or cope with our envi­
ronment depends not only on how veridically we 
can mirror our environment but also on how se­
lectively we can perceive. We do not wish to 
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' perceive the characteristic of every person in 
a crowded room when we are hurriedly searching 
for one friend. 
Also we do not want to have to huild up a new 
veridical perception of our environment every 
day. It is far more efficient to take new ex­
perience and to dissolve it or articulate it in 
the light of past experience and dominant or 
habitual sets. Thus our coping efforts may at 
times Ъе better served if we are able to dis­
regard some stimuli, modify our interpretations 
of others, and axticulate or structure incoming 
stimuli according to our memorie traces, expec­
tancies, and goals. Perception is then personal 
in that a percept may be seen as sensation plus 
meaning. 
Each individual could be considered to be 
carrying with him his past relations to his 
environment, his emotional dispositions, and 
his own expectancies for his future in his own 
constellation of perceptual and cognitive sets. 
As Allport accurately comments, "Thus to exist 
as a person means to go beyond the veridical 
and the cultural, and to evolve one's own out­
look on the world" (196I, p. 266). 
Men differ in their perceptual and cognitive 
outlook on the world, some find it full of dis­
tractions and frustrations while others find it 
to be small, empty, and dull. There are many 
variations among individuals in these respects 
but let us now consider what can be learned 
from investigating these approaches. 
A. Dispositional patterns of cognition and 
perception. 
There have been several investigations which 
have studied what may be called "personal con­
structs", "cognitive styles" or "perceptual 
response dispositions". 
Witkin (1954) and his co-workers showed from 
their investigation that individuals differ in 
their dependency upon the constraints of the 
situation in which they find themselves. The 
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individuals characterized Ъу field-dependency 
are very dependent upon environmental supports; 
they lack ability to initiate, are in many re­
spects passive, are not insightful regarding 
their inner life, and tend to have low self-
esteem and low self-acceptance. ïïhile the field-
independent subjects, Ъу contrast, do not demand 
environmental supports; have initiative and or­
ganizing ability; they are aware of their own 
inner life and accept their impulses even while 
they have good control over them, etc. These 
findings dramatically demonstrate that an in­
dividual approaches his world with a broad per­
ceptual disposition and will have tendencies 
either to be passively rigid or actively and 
flexibly adaptive. 
These findings have been further elaborated and 
extended in the research carried on by Gardner 
and his co-workers (1959)· Their studies have 
demonstrated that people differ in the emphasis 
they give to one or another of the configura-
tional qualities of objects. They illustrate 
that if we think of response as coerced not by 
stimuli s alone or by motives alone, but also 
by the organizational dispositions of the re­
sponding system, then universal as well as 
varying responses can be accounted for within 
a conception of organismic controls. They offer 
the concept of cognitive control as one means 
of ordering person's variations in responses 
to both environmental stimuli and drives. 
They conceive of cognitive controls as slow-
changing, developmentally stabilized structures: 
that are relatively invariant over a given 
class of situations and intentions; they operate 
despite the shifts in situational and behavioral 
contexts typical of cognitive activity from 
moment to moment. They are further seen to refer 
to a level of organization that is more general 
than the specific structural compenents under­
lying perception, recall, and judgement. The 
invariemt which defines a control has to do with 
the manner of coordination between a class of 
adaptive intensions and a class of environmental 
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situations. They are in essence the individual'b 
means of programming the properties, relations, 
and constraints of events and objects in such a 
way as to provide an adaptively adequate resolu-
tion of the intentions which brought him into an 
encounter with reality. 
The adaptive functions assumed for cognitive 
controls are: 
(l) They govern the extent of informational feedback - the degree 
and extent of renewed encounter with stimuli or ideas before an 
adaptive intension is deemed met and an adaptive behavioral 
sequence is terminated. (2) They involve the application of 
"automized standards of adequacy" to behavior or experience. If 
the behavioral outcome does not meet these standards of adequacy, 
perceptual or ideational activity is renewed to a point of re-
flecting the inherent requirement of the control. (3) The outcome 
of a cognitive control is a pattern of "attribution", in which 
stimulus events and ideas are brought into a relation to each 
other as relevant and irrelevant, experienced and nonexperienced, 
segments of a stimulus field (1959, P· 10-11). 
They stress, however, that controls are not 
identical in respect to these adaptive functions. 
Though control organizations originate in part 
from drive-environment interaction they are seen 
as having a degree of independence from drives. 
The momentum of development includes a continuous 
process of internalizing reality through the for-
mation of models of reality in the inner world. 
These models are constructed under the impetus 
of drives which will change in character as the 
models of reality continue to serve in the pro-
gramming of stimuli and the channeling of drives 
into certain directions of satisfaction and not 
others. Thus modification of drives will go hand 
in hand with changes in control structure. 
The dimensions of cognitive organization dis-
covered by Gardner and his co-workers have been 
shown through factor analytic studies to be in-
dependent aspects of cognitive control which 
appear in broad but discrete classes of adaptive 
situations that involve generically different 
adaptive requirements. Re-test reliability stu-
dies ranging over periods up to three years have 
shown the enduring aspects of these controls. 
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The first principle of cognitive organization 
illucidated Ъу Gardner extends one of the dimen­
sions discovered Ъу Witkin and involves ability 
in field-articulation. This suggests a pattern 
of adeptness of attention deployment. Those sub­
jects adept at field-articulation, "Seem capable 
of selectively attending to relevant versus 
irrelevant cues, memories, or ideas with a flexi­
bility that overrides the particular organiza­
tional properties of the "field". These results 
suggest that subjects who are adept at selective 
attention under various conditions are able to 
relinguish dominant sets with relative ease. 
That is, they are able to direct attention fle­
xibly to nondominant ideas or modes of solution, 
when such direction is adaptively relevant" 
(i960, p. 22). This principle would seem to 
operate through mobilization af attention hyper-
cathexes upon the most relevant segments of an 
informational array. This principle may also 
show some relations to such personality factors 
as group identification vs. individuality. Also 
if individuals are characterized by differences 
in the selectiveness of attention at early stages 
in development, this aspect of their behavior 
could have implications for the differantiations 
with which the external world is experienced and 
hence could have implications for memory organi­
zation. 
Another principle of cognitive control is that 
of leveling-sharpening ffhich can be defined as 
a dimension of individual consistencies in the 
degree to which new stimuli and relevant meory 
traces assimilate to each other. Correlational 
and factor-analytic results of their studies 
suggests that subjects at the leveling end of 
score distributions formed relatively undiffe­
rentiated memory schemata in a variety of situa­
tions involving temporal sequences of stimuli. 
Sharpeners, however, seem to register discrete 
memories of successive stimulation which can be 
seen to lead to recoverability of past experien­
ces in relatively unaltered form, for purposes 
of comparison with new stimulation. In levelers, 
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successive perceptual impressions would he assi-
milated to each other in such a way that distinc-
tions among them would be blurred. It is also 
possible to join Gardner in his speculation that 
extreme leveling tendencies may provide the con-
ditions under which repression can become the 
major defense machanism employed by a person. It 
nevertheless brings forth the question of atten-
tion availability, which may be low in levelers 
and thus limit their capacity for concentration. 
A third principle of cognitive control involves 
consistent individual differences in the exten-
siveness of scanning or attention deployment in 
situations requiring decisions about relations 
between stimuli, in particular size estimations. 
This seems to have special reference to Piaget's 
degrees of "decentration" or overstimation of 
that object which lies longer in the attentional 
field than the comparison object. Extensive 
scanning would be equated with broad awareness 
of many aspects of the stimulus field whereas 
limited scanners would be much narrower in their 
deployment of attention and awareness. These two 
scanning positions also appear to mark signifi-
cantly different positions in employment of the 
defense mechanisms of isolation and projection. 
The limited scanner will attend primarily to the 
obvious and interesting standard stimuli and will 
tend toward overestimation while the extensive 
scanner will tend toward relative underestima-
tion. 
Still another control is the equivalence-range 
principle which appears relevant to a particular 
aspect of concept formation and differentiation, 
namely, the inclusiveness of conceptual realms 
delimited under relatively "free" conditions. A 
narrow equivalence-range seems to imply detailed 
categorization of certain aspects of experience 
according to relatively exact standards for 
judging similarity. Their groupings are rela-
tively abstract and impersonal in contrast to 
the broad equivalence-range subjects who include 
a wide variety of objects or object properties 
in groups classified according to single attri-
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butes along the lines of associated meanings or 
connotative implications. The narrow equivalence-
range subject tends to respond more to the inhe-
rent physical properties of objects rather than 
to consider them in terms of personal experien-
ces. In the Rorschach Test, broad-range subjects 
appear to project more human and humanlike con-
tent into the blots, use more color determina-
tions and experience human movement more freely 
than narrow-range subjects. The essential diffe-
rence between subjects at these opposite poles 
seems to lie in the degree to which they are 
impelled to act upon or ignore an awareness of 
difference. 
The last clearly defined principle of control 
identified by Gardner's group involves tolerance 
for unrealistic experiences. Tolerance for insta-
bility implies the ability to accept experiences 
which do not agree with or violate previous ex-
perience and to organize them according to other 
than rational interpretations. Intolerance for 
instability implies resistance to perceptual or 
cognitive experience in which ideational or im-
mediate sense data controvert conventional 
reality. They also show notable constriction in 
acceptance of affect experiences; this sort of 
dissociative pattern suggests limited ability to 
shift sets. 
The principles of field articulation and leve-
ling- sharpening have been shown by factorial 
studies carried out by Gardner (i960) to be 
closely related to intellectual abilities. Field-
articulation was shown to be related to abili-
ties in flexibility of closure, spatial relations 
and orientation, associative memory, and induc-
tive reasoning; while levelingrsharpening was 
found relevant for performance in tasks of asso-
ciative memory. 
Stagner (1961) sees personality as an indivi-
dual's unique way of perceiving his environment, 
including himself. This manner of defining per-
sonality has the advantage that it raises per-
ceptual and cognitive operations to a level 
where they can be seen to combine with our drives 
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or motives to form a Ъазіс mode of striving to 
comprehend our environment. Our sets or tenden­
cies are composed of feeling ana cognition and 
appear in the form of personal traits or basic 
modes of striving and thinking. These sets, ten­
dencies, or dispositions can Ъе seen to direct 
our percepts, images, judgements, and expectan­
cies in regard to our personal environment. 
These sets can in turn be seen as cognitive con­
trols and each individual's combination of con­
trols may form a cognitive style. Our environ­
ment and culture account for much of the unifor­
mity that can be found between different cogni­
tive styles, but the uniqueness of each cogni­
tive style appears through the manner of assimi­
lating these factors into a personal existence. 
Disordered lives as a rule show signs of percep­
tual and cognitive crippling. A style of life 
is formed which is marked by a crippling, rigid, 
endeavor to find some anchor of security in a 
bewildering changing world. Let us now attempt 
to discern what perceptual and cognitive styles 
will tend toward disorder. 
B. Perceptual development in autism. 
This is the point in our presentation where we 
would like to reconsider and articulate the 
already cited statement by Gardner Murphy that, 
"If we understand the differences in "percei­
ving", we shall go far in understanding the dif­
ferences in the resulting behavior". 
The individual personality betrays its unique 
potentiality not only in the content that it 
displays at each stage in development, but also 
in the manner in which differantiation takes 
place and in the form and dynamics of its inte­
gration. Also each differentiated part displays 
a similar progression from homogeneity to dif­
ferentiation and then integration. 
As such the global dispositions of the first 
stage may be seen to be characteristic of the 
individual and to persist as the base of all 
differentiations and ultimate integrations. We 
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find basic motor, sensory, affective, and intel­
ligence dispositions characteristic of indivi­
duals from birth. In this manner, each specific 
sense perception could appear to be superposed 
upon an intersensory quality which would repre­
sent a characteristic form of interaction between 
sensory modalities. Further the interdependence 
of traits within an individual reveals not only 
the individuality of the specific capacities, 
but also the individuality of the interrelations 
between them. Under acute stress or states of 
disorder, when well organized or integrated acts 
are lost, we may re-confront more general dispo­
sitions. It appears that the adult mind operates 
all the time at all three levels of development 
and that each individual has his own balance of 
the three. 
The first stage in development is basically a 
neural one and the infant cannot go through any 
further stages in confronting his environment 
unless he is motivated and biologically disposed 
toward differentiating. 
To begin let us consider what influence global 
dispositions might have on the development of 
perception. Schachtel, Stirniman, and others, 
have pointed out the selectiveness of attention 
at early stages in infant development. Indivi­
dual differences have been observed in infants 
turning toward light, color, and sound hours 
after birth. Charlotte Buhler (195Θ) speaks of 
four primary individual tendencies such as 
creative expansion, adaptive self limitation, 
order, and discharge, which will, she feels, in­
fluence ultimate goal setting. These could be 
equated to Allport's conception of a personal 
disposition as being a generalized neuropsychic 
structure peculiar to the individual. 
The first stage in the act of perception is pre­
paratory in nature and involves states of per­
ceptual expectancy before stimulation. Global 
dispositions would then play an important part 
in this process, and the nature of their affect 
and activity components would establish sets for 
further expectancies which in turn form schematic 
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frames of reference into which sensory informa­
tion is organized. This also has reference to 
Gardner's field-articulation control for the 
nature of a personal disposition could Ъе an im­
portant influence on the capaMlity to attend 
selectively to relevant versus irrelevant cues 
which has implications for the differentiation 
of ultimate memory organization. 
This control factor is also evident in the se­
cond stage of the perceptual act which involves 
the selective, integrative, and energie aspects 
of attention deployment. The level of articula­
tion is directly related to the degree of con­
centration and energy investment or intensity 
which in turn controls the level of inhibition 
placeahle on irrelevant cues. Energy investment 
patterns also appear to Ъе related to general 
dispositions. 
The differentiation of relevant cues in the 
field is also related to the control of scanning 
or attention deployment in situations requiring 
decisions about relations between stimuli. Exten­
sive scanning would result in broad awareness of 
many aspects of the stimulus field with resul­
ting less distortion or overstimulation than that 
characteristic of individuals who scan limitedly 
and thus deploy attention and awareness narrowly. 
The extensive scanner is found to employ the 
defense of isolation significantly more than that 
of projection. 
The most optimal conditions for articulation, 
differentiation and resultant integration are 
expressed in the controls of high field-articu­
lation and extensive scanning which would form 
an integrated and differentiated hierarchical 
system and integrated contiguity of stimulation. 
These two controls and stages in perception ap­
pear as the key to adaptive coordination with 
the external and internal world, for through 
their control of the relevance and sharpness of 
perception memory becomes a differentiated and 
integrated tool which leads to the relatively 
unaltered recovery of past experiences and the 
integration of organized systems of meaning. 
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A disposition leading to low field-articulation 
and narrow scanning would result in low levels 
of articulation and awareness, fixation of atten-
sion on the most prominent stimulus features; 
difficulties in effecting closure and in esta-
blishing spatial relations and orientation would 
also be prominent, and may be seen to lead to 
faulty modes of utilization of available cues. 
The development of memory under these conditions 
would be thwarted and leveled in that the dif-
fuseness of the perceptual impressions would 
lead to an assimilation of the distinctions be-
tween resulting in loose relatively undifferen-
tiated memory schemata. Meaning would then de-
pend on the context or dominant affect or ten-
sion state. 
Weil (1955) in her study of schizophrenic chil-
dren reports a syndrome of manifestations, which 
she describes as "lack of structure or focus", 
"diffuseness" with regard to anxiety as well as 
with regard to aggression, outgoingness and pas-
sivity in these children. She comes to the con-
clusion that a constitutional factor, a "predis-
position in Greenacre's sense" must be assumed 
to be effective in combination with early dis-
tress. 
Fish and Alpert (1963) in their investigation of 
infants born to schizophrenic mothers discuss 
the deviations in state of consciousness, vesti-
bular function, motility, and muscle tonus ob-
served in thirty percent of these infants within 
the first days of life. They find a dissociation 
between the motor and sensory aspects of arousal 
in these infants and feel that their persistent 
tonic response may be related to dysfunction of 
the development of the reticular formation. 
Here we may again call attention to Lindsley's 
observation that additional activation by the 
reticular system causes a desynchronization of 
the alpha rhythm due to differentiation responsi-
veness of underlying cortical fields. This dif-
ferentiation he feels could be based upon innate 
organization, past experience or learned pat-
terns, which through the frequent association of 
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certain units beating in aggregates make those 
patterns more likely to accur again. Stimulation 
of the reticular formation can reduce reaction 
time to a visual stimulus as well as modify per­
ceptual duration and consolidation. 
Of these last factors the speed of reaction time 
and perceptual duration would seem to be related 
to the activation level of the reticular system 
while the nature of the desynchronization may 
control the level of facilitation of differen­
tiation or discrimination. This in turn would 
influence consolidation. Lindsley, among others, 
draws attention to the facultative function of 
the reticular formation and also its potential 
for specific alerting. For man, monkey, and cat 
the normal two-flash threshold for two flashes 
just barely seen as two is roughly Θ0 msec, at 
a 50 msec, interval only one flash is observed; 
under condition of reticular stimulation two 
flashes are observed at 50 msec, in the visual 
cortex of the experimental monkey or cat. 
It would appear from the neurological studies 
made of the reticular system and from the psycho­
logical analysis of the behavioral reactions 
that two attention factors are involved; namely, 
an elaboration of articulation of relevant cues 
and a differentiation or fractionation of parts 
toward a congruence of associations. The level 
of articulation might control the breadth of 
reception while the fractionation might control 
the difference values formed between cues. This 
type of supposition would at least place reti­
cular functions in alignment with the two con­
trols of field-articulation and. scanning just 
mentioned. 
Let us advance further and try to account for 
the fact that conditions of sensory deprivation 
and reticular depressing drugs account for a 
reduction and refinement of associations in 
schizophrenic patients; while it is hinted that 
reticular stimulating drugs increase the quan­
tity and quality of associations of early auti­
stic children. It would appear that these types 
of associational problems would be identical 
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with the extremes of the leveling-sharpening 
control continuum. This control involves the 
degree of assimilation between present stimula-
tion and memorie traces. Extreme leveling would 
result in a blurring of distinctions and a loose 
undifferentiated set of memory schemata, which 
might lead to enough distortion to cause severe 
disorientation and hallucinations. Very extreme 
sharpening on the other hand would result in 
such discrete differentiation of memorie traces 
and schemata that the present stimulation would 
be identical with the memory trace, which would 
involve lack of breadth in orientation and a 
demand for order and constancy. The process of 
trial or tentative characterization of the sti-
mulus situation against the background of the 
dominant memorie schemata would result in gross 
assimilation in both instances. 
The level of behavioral meaning will depend upon 
the level of perceptual differantiation and in-
tegration and will structure the level of senso-
ry search. The meaning systems derived from 
these two extremes of associational assimilation 
reflect their lack of integration and will be 
laden with innate affective patterns of beha-
vior. 
At the risk of losing or destroying some of the 
interactional components and dynamics present 
in any interrelationship of organizational dis-
positions a schema will now be presented in an 
attempt to illustrate certain suppositions about 
what influence certain patterns or clusters of 
perceptual and cognitive controls might have on 
the ultimate course of developmental differentia-
tion and the formation of particular cognitive 
styles of adaptation. This effort involves a 
dangerous level of speculation since it must, 
for the purpose of explanation, postulate cer-
tain causal relations that have not at this time 
been proven to exist. Its purpose is to stimu-
late heuristic attempts to clarify what role 
neuropsychic structures might play in forming 
individual variations in tendencies toward auti-
stic perception. 
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The schema presents a hierarchial system of 
superordinated levels of differentiation in per­
ceptual and cognitive control. Each point along 
a horizontal axis represents a progression from 
less homogeneity toward further differentiation. 
The interdependence of positions of differentia­
tion along each level will Ъе seen as marking 
the dominance of specific dispositions as well 
as illustrating their interrelations in the 
formation of a perceptual or cognitive style. 
The dimensional levels can Ъе seen to diminish 
in terms of inclusive of specificity. 
non-adept (A) (B) adept 
Field-Articulation (selective 
attention) 
narrow (A) 
Scanning (attention 
deployment) 
leveling (A) ,_(B), 
Associations (trial 
"broad (A) 
Conceptual 
Realms 
extensive 
sharpening 
& check) 
narrow 
tolerant \ (A) ( B ) / intolerant 
rigidity 
of sets 
Now that we have committed ourselves to an appa­
ratus we must attempt to discern if it is ade­
quate as a mode of explanation. All development 
will be seen as progressing from the left pole 
of homogeneity toward the right pole of specific 
differentiation; thus each point will refer to a 
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level of organization or pattern of attribution 
of disposition-environment interactions and may 
Ъе seen as a model of reality characteristic of 
that level of organization. 
The left polar points of the schema would thus 
describe levels of organization characterized 
respectively by: limited attention deployment 
with poor mobilization of attention hyperca-
thexes upon the aspects of relevance in an in­
formational array; narrow scanning or focusing 
of attention on only dominant segments of a 
stimulus field; low level of concentration with 
high interaction or leveling of memory trace 
and percept; with broad equivalence of object 
properties based on sensory contact and affect 
and tension states; and organization of expe­
riences according to affect feeling states. 
The initial points or positions of developmental 
differentiation will rest upon the tonicity of 
personal-genetic dispositions toward the breadth 
of stimuli equivalence and the level of emotio­
nal interaction with the environmental stimula­
tion. 
From our consideration of the genetic components 
encircled in the syndromes of early infantile 
autism and childhood schizophrenia it appears 
that they may describe two polar extremes in 
tendencies toward differentiation dispositions. 
The autistic child as seen by Rimland expresses 
an organism designed for high intelligence and 
differentiation which is afflicted with an ina­
bility to link sensation with all but a highly 
delimited fraction of memory. The schizophrenic 
child, on the other hand, appears to be patho­
logically unrestrained by relevance in making 
associations. The demographic data accumulsted 
on the respective personality-intelligence con­
figurations displayed by the parents of autistic 
as opposed to schizophrenic children would fur­
ther establish that the characteristics of ex­
treme intellectual control over emotions, in-
distractibility, and selectivity of communica­
tion between percept and memory displayed by 
the parents of autistic children weuld place 
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them in a bipolar relation to the types of do­
minant disposition patterns characteristic of 
the parents of schizophrenic children. 
Would this then lead to the formation of a sup­
position that both types of configurations may 
contain predispositions toward autistic percep­
tion? In a cautious and limited sense this does 
appear to be the situation. Overly tight asso­
ciation or overly loose association of experience 
to memory would in both cases exclude a proper 
balance of recognition, discrimination and inte­
gration of cues from both the inner and external 
world. Neither brittle rigidity nor variation 
with the direction in which the wind blows could 
lead to adaptive coping with the external world. 
Our schema would then appear to identify two 
extremes with the middle positions offering the 
best opportunities for adequate flexible adapta­
tion. 
The point must, however, be made that the auti­
stic children described by Kanner and illucidated 
by Rimland appear to be suffering from a primary 
deficiency disorder in their ability to adequa­
tely pattern their perception in a hierarchial 
ordering which will facilitate integration. 
Their ability to scan or order with respect to 
the range of attending is fixed as it were at 
such a narrow range that they exaggerate the 
figure to the point of losing the ground ani 
thus lose a basis for hierarchial integration. 
This deficiency is seemingly present at birth 
and thus disorts their future development; they 
thus in a sense describe an autistic state of 
disbalance, which for them is a relatively fixed 
state and places them in a categorization of 
oligophrenic states. They in another sense dis­
play the extreme to which their parents show 
dispositions towards while still being able to 
return to a state of balance. This extreme in 
so far as it is not connected with the presence 
of an oligophrenic condition will be seen as 
describing a state of autistic perception, in 
that it may reach a dissociative level. 
Most individuals are not, however, disposed to 
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either of the extreme positions mentioned, hut 
more or less inhabit the middle ground; how must 
we then account for their variations in autistic 
perception? Let us then examine two hypothetical 
individuals to see what their variations and 
interrelations in differential development along 
the various dimensions might imply for their per­
ceptual or cognitive styles and tendencies to­
ward autistic perception. 
If we re-examine the schema we 'will find that 
individual A and individual В occupy different 
hypothetical positions along the various dimen­
sional levels of differentiation. Their respect­
ive positions along these dimensions can he said 
to form an interdependent pattern of disposi­
tions which will generate specific styles of 
perception or cognition. Each position can he 
seen as a point of anchorage which serves to 
structure or organize the realm of received cues 
about some dominant aspect of the array. The 
level of differentiation of cues will be inte­
grated according to the patterning of stimula­
tion cues from various modalities, a petterning 
in which sensory modalities are combined with 
complex ideational and affective elements. The 
unity of any response will_thus be a function of 
the configuration; the patterning of outer sti­
muli in or through the configuration will depend 
upon the still more complex patterning of inter­
nal components. The range or breadth of this 
patterning and the quality of differentiation of 
elements will influence the generality or trans­
fer level of these response traits. This is illu­
strated in the individual variations in condi­
tioning and transfer. Through this process cer­
tain dominant cues will become figure to the 
ground of others. The anchorage points will de­
pend upon constitutional adequacy, drive patterns 
and experience ала their respective influences 
upon the variability of the thresholds. 
To go further in our speculation, it would appear 
that individual (A), on the schema, is anchored 
at a relatively lower level of accentuation or 
articulation of the field than (в), who, through 
83 
a more flexible mobilization of attention hyper-
cathexes, would be more adept at attending to 
relevant versus irrelevant cues and more accu­
rate in his ability to impose his own patterning 
upon even a highly organized external field. 
This type of ability would offer greater control 
over affect and the possibility of greater in­
corporation of drive into long-range planning. 
On the dimension of scanning, individual (в) 
would be anchored at a relatively higher level 
of extensiveness of scanning which would give 
him more aptitude in the ability to differen­
tiate and fractionate his field of relevant cues 
so that they form more cohesive hierarchial 
levels and more congruence in association. His 
high level of feedback would make it possible 
for him to more adequately organize his various 
difference values in the light of the present 
situation and to control the level of affective 
reaction. 
These first two dimensions appear to control the 
levels of sensitivity, reactivity, and inhibi­
tion of behavioral plasticity which in turn have 
the highest influence on retentivity. It would 
appear that the extent of selective articulation 
and its relation to inhibitatory refinement of 
the relevant stimulus cues will have a signifi­
cant effect on the attainment of retentional 
refinement. This point may be illustrated by 
envisioning the anchorage point of individual 
(A) or (В) on the field-articulation dimension 
as a ball which when it fell would be pulled by 
the valence force of the scanning factor to a 
point roughly half their variance and in its 
further free fall describe a point on the leve-
ling-sharpening dimension. This is in effect 
merely saying that the balance achieved between 
extent of differentiation of articulation and 
differentiation of scanning may influence the 
differential development of memory. Some evi­
dence for this point might be seen in the fact 
that the curve of learning and the curve of for­
getting controversial material as Levine has 
demonstrated show the consistent operation of 
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autistic factors. Even if this speculation does 
not prove ultimately accurate it merits further 
investigation. 
Perhaps this whole trend of thought can Ъе 
hrought into alignment with the rule formulated 
Ъу Mc Gregor that as structure becomes fluid 
through the reduction of information, autism 
becomes more marked. In the case of individual 
(A) whose drives may more affectively structure 
his analysis of differences we could well see 
that a reduction in information may markedly in­
fluence his perception towards the autistic pole. 
If individual (В) suffered a reduction in infor­
mation we might well observe that the rigidity 
and divorcement from affect characteristic of 
his structures might cause them to dissociate 
into separate worlds which might Ъе oblivious of 
external reality and affective needs and in this 
sense be markedly autistic. 
It could then be said that autism, involving a 
search for similarities, can and very often does 
select which similarities are to be employed in 
terms of the drive structure of the individual 
making the comparisons and groupings. This need 
not be a fantasy approach; it need only to be 
an approach which involves structuring according 
to the manner in which the affective system con­
tributes to the organization of the perceptual 
or cognitive pattern. As such we can more accu­
rately expect that individuals will show dis­
tinctive patterns of autism, rather than general 
tendencies toward autism. This is also what we 
would be lead to expect from our schema for with 
each degree of overly loose or overly rigid re­
ception and structuring of information we find 
commensurately three, seven, and nine degree 
changes in the plasticity or rigidity of memory 
schemata, concept formation, and acceptance of 
affective and less rational experiences in life. 
Our groupings of things, people, societies, etc, 
will also determine, or perhaps better said, 
express our attitudes toward our culture, fel­
low-men, and ourselves. 
We must agree with Murphy's expression, from 
Θ5 
Fromm, "We have learned to emphasize "freedom 
from"; we know little indeed about "freedom for" 
- freedom that guarantees a basic and genera­
lized habit of mobilizing all one's energies to 
meet a new situation. If we knew more about the 
biological factors involved in the anchorage 
process, we could make recommendations for the 
preservation in the individual of the particular 
kind of spontaneity that is his" (1947» PP· 352-
353). 
Let us now consider what we have discussed to 
this point in an attempt to determine what di­
rections might be taken to reach a better under­
standing of "freedom for". 
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штнсшисткж ТО РАИТ I I I 
IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR THEORY 
The view which has Ъееп proposed in the prece­
ding chapters must, however, regard the acts of 
seeking, attending, and scanning as aspects of 
a complex system of acts in a perceptual-cogni­
tive process of meeting, adapting, attempting 
to find meaning, and forming hehavior relevant 
to the world perceived. The organismic activity 
or perceiving or structuring is then Ъазіс and 
dynamically involved in the acquisition of overt 
hehavior acts. 
This may be the key for further speculation, 
which may ultimately show that the sensory, mo­
tor, and central systems of the organism are 
designed and work to fluidly structure the orga­
nism so as to make the hest of relations with 
the potential stimulating environment. The cen­
tral system must work to coordinate its recep­
tion of sensory information and directing of 
energy according to a dynamic pattern of change 
in the light of experience, which supplies the 
motor system with new cues and central reorgani­
zation. Personality can then perhaps best be 
seen not as a form of organization but as a di­
rection of development. A direction which is 
based upon internal directives which cause the 
individual to move forward following an inner 
tune, while moving also in answer to the chan­
ging accompaniment found in the external world. 
At times he may not be able to completely har­
monize the melodies. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Individual Organism 
The individual organism can he neither consi­
dered as an isolated object nor as homogeneous 
with the environment for either condition would 
herald the end of its existence. It is rather a 
space of more or less structuring in a field of 
complex and ever changing relations. Structure 
implies a system involving relations, such that 
the organism is continually in contact with the 
environment hut is neither overwhelmed Ъу it or 
isolated from it. This system must also provide 
for chances for change and growth, along with a 
preservation of structural stability. Under 
gross impairment the structure reforms itself 
at a new level of organization. These are rele­
vant areas for the focusing of biochemical stu­
dies which may in the future broaden our under­
standing of these processes. 
The organic system as a tension system is as 
unhomogeneous as a field for it involves a com­
plex system of interdependent aspects, with 
shifting structural relations and nodal regions 
of high energy concentration. Individual growth 
can be seen as organized in that not only parts 
change according to an order but the system as 
a whole changes according to a unified dynamic. 
Uniqueness would then seem to lie not in the 
components but in their modes of interrelation. 
A. New light on constitutional givens. 
Light on what the individual constitution means 
for the ultimate development of an individual 
has flickered and withered as men have focused 
their attention on learning and social factors, 
for the moment forgetting their points of an­
chorage. On this point Murphy accurately com­
ments, "To forget the stuff of which man the 
organism is built may facilitate the construc­
tion of ideal patterns . . . . but adjustments 
ΘΘ 
to these patterns may involve tensions or, often 
enough, biological contradictions" (1947> Ρ·4θ). 
Following his formulation no organism different.-
ly constituted could acquire in the same way or 
acquire the same tendencies or traits. 
These tendencies or traits will be found to dis­
play varying degrees of modifiability, depending 
partly upon which are involved, the severity of 
environmental pressure, and the developmental 
period during which the pressure is applied. In­
dividuality always appears no matter the extent 
of the environmental pressure or the elaboration 
or variation of the cultural modes. 
Psychology has in many instances concerned it­
self with generalizations based on averages, at 
times to its own confusion. It is possible to 
attempt to order color blindness into three dis­
tinct types but it necessitates overlooking many 
forms and gradiations of color weakness, which 
appear from many modes of interrelation of the 
constitutional dispositions. It would appear 
then that equal attention is due to the indivi­
dual constitutional dispositions and their par­
ticipative roles when considering the process of 
personality development, either when hunting for 
facts or building hypothetical constructs. 
If we analize the sensory system we find wide 
individual differences in the sensitivity of the 
varous sensory modalities, some of which can be 
observed even shortly after birth. Studies of 
latencies and length of after-discharge might 
also lead us into a study of the affective as­
pects of sensory responses. Individuality can be 
seen even very early in sensory interests and 
selective response to the world of sensory sti­
mulation. It would seem clear that these pat­
terns of selectivity and their associated affec­
tive responses might aid us in discerning the 
ultimate direction of individual development. 
The role of constitutional differences in endo­
crine functions is broad and may predispose to­
ward various patterns of emotional instability. 
It has also been discovered that patterns of ad­
justment involving the nervous system control in 
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many ways the endocrine balance, thus the com­
plexities in the field of psychosomatic mede-
cine. 
Histological studies have indicated that the 
development of the various parts of the cortex 
follow distinct individual patterns, resulting 
in different rates and types of functional matu­
ration. It may then be that qualitative varia­
bility in various parts of the cortex or in the 
integration and communication of various parts 
could account for differences in the nature of 
sensory expereinces in the various fields. Many 
individuals vary in the quality, type, and per­
sistences of imagery some being predominately 
visual, auditory, olfactory, or even imageless. 
Perhaps the sheer intensity of cortical response 
may, along with latencies and after discharge, 
be of utmost importance in relation to the ca­
pacity to become interested and to sustain at­
tention and orientation on a given mental task. 
Also the ability to maintain a set for an absent 
object, or the ability to order and structure 
the confused world of the senses may be seen as 
dependent upon certain cortical patterns. There 
are also structured or patterned interrelations 
that depend upon the dominance of one system 
over another or on the facilitating or inhibi­
ting effects of the various components upon one 
another. 
Diamond in a discussion of inhibition, the lim­
bic structures, and states of disturbance cites 
Mac Lean's allegory in which he "likens the re­
lations of the limbic lobe and the neocortex to 
those of horse and rider, two creatures very 
much alive to each other and to their environ­
ment, yet communication between them is limited. 
The "patient and sympathethic horseman" must try 
to learn why the horse may shy ала bolt for 
reasons at first inexplicable to the horseman in 
an effort to reduce this maladaptive overre-
sponsiveness" (1963? Ρ· З З). 
Other writers speak of the variations in indivi­
dual dispositions toward functional cleavage or 
dissociation; from this it appears that we may 
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find wide individual differences in the degree 
to which a given pair of behavior systems inter-
fere with each other. 
The similarities between the phases of develop-
ment, psycho-neural mechanisms, cognitive con-
trols, and molar components of the act of per-
ception which we have considered would tend to 
imply that we have touched upon some aspects and 
traits central to the balance between behavioral 
characteristics and genetic perceptual and cog-
nitive dispositions. Our further speculations 
about specific dispositions toward differentia-
tion and their interrelational influence upon 
cognitive styles and tendencies toward distinc-
tive patterns of autism receive some support 
from our overall considerations but remain spe-
culative as do our related speculations on in-
terdependent neuro-psychic structures and sy-
stems. 
Up to this point, we have occupied ourselves 
with cross sections in time, states of balance, 
levels of differentiation, energy deployment 
manners, and relations of sensation to expe-
rience. Personality, however, is a continuity 
determined partly by impulsions from without, 
but nevertheless maintaining a recognizable in-
dividuality, a recurrence of patterned tenden-
cies such as permits the recognition of an iden-
tity. 
We may ask ourselves what aspects of our consi-
deration and the speculations formulated there 
from would aid us in directing each individual 
with his own personal constellation of disposi-
tions and resultant style and identity toward a 
greater realization of his inherent potentiality; 
wh^t must we attempt to "free-him-for"? 
B. Personality as man's mode of search. 
Allport presents a formulation from Hindu psy-
chology which holds that most men have four cen-
tral desires and that to some extent, though 
only roughly, they correspond to earlier and 
later periods of life. These include pleasure, 
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success, duty and "finally toward the end of 
one's life, comes a desire for understanding-
for philosophical or religious meaning - and 
with it a longing for liberation from the plea-
sure - success - duty stages of T,ife" (196I, p. 
565). 
It is observable then, not only that individuals 
have different desires, but that they set up 
complex personal systems of wants which are re-
latively enduring and are maintained even in 
the absence of external reminders; they carry 
around with themselves personal systems of value. 
We could say that they structure their percep-
tions according to their needs or anticipations. 
If a need, however, reaches a vital pitch the 
act to which it leads may become and remain do-
minant, with the result that the usual shifting 
patterns of trial and error are inhibited. The 
child or adult when severely frustrated after 
making a mistake may be in such distress that -
the inner influences being reinforced and the 
outer cues serving no purpose - they go on fu-
riously doing the wrong thing over and over 
again. Their lability gone the child or adult 
may fixate on the behavioral act which is cau-
sing their suffering. We may recognize that 
those individuals who we see as "rigid", "sure", 
"diffuse", "vexed", or "withdrawn" are usually 
those individuals who have crystallized forms of 
failure to adapt. 
The broad individual differences in the lability 
or fixity of such orientations and the capacity 
to shift one's instrumental activity as the need 
persists, are among the most important factors 
in personality. The traits involved include per-
severation, negativism or the resistance to 
outer pressure, and perhaps even more important 
a basic disposition toward the maintenance of 
set in contrast to a pattern of flexible atten-
tion shift. In these cases it appears that re-
peated and intense frustration have taught him 
not only that his behavior in this instance is 
not successful but have caused him to generalize 
to "nothing I do succeeds". Thi£ pattern of 
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failure to adapt is exactly the same pattern 
shown by some animals suffering from experimen­
tal neurosis, who in the final stages show a 
behavioral rigidity which may even progress to 
muscular rigidity or at the other extreme of 
withdrawal a "waxy flexibility" of the extre­
mities; so that we either find a passive help­
lessness or prolonged defiance. Another type of 
pattern may be extreme vacillation in which at­
tention may jump from one to another object - a 
"flight into reality". 
We need not go to the experimental laboratory 
to find such frustrating experiences for in талу 
cases our prejudiced cultures, rigid schools, 
and cold societies produce enough blockage and 
rigidity in the brilliant or slow pupil who 
after years of frustration and resultant muscu­
lar cramps and hypertension may become a heart 
patient - if nothing more. 
As Ann Roe has shown in some of her studies 
there are significant correlations between cer­
tain professions and the type of imagery em­
ployed. It may then not be sheer chance that 
one individual who thinks almost exclusively in 
words may become a writer while another who 
thinks almost completely in terms of visual 
images has never been able to completely master 
the grammar of his language. 
Once the laws governing the associative system 
are as well understood as those of the physical 
sciences, education may prove able to release 
the individual personality in terms of its real 
potential rather than only in terms of the sur­
face context and casual connections which ac­
tually constitute the educational process in the 
early years. 
In our consideration of autism we attempted to 
show that one perceives, structures, or thinks 
in terms of expectancies, needs, or sets and 
that the attainment of intellectual freedom is 
not merely a negative рг ЪІет of removing dis­
tortions, but a positive problem of setting 
free the individual capacity to understand 
through releasing the blocked associative sy-
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sterns of the individual. In many ways it is not 
the stupid individual who fails in most creative 
situations but rather the individual bound in 
autistic thought, who, equipped with adequate 
material and unreleased dispositions, repeatedly 
comes perversely to the wrong conclusion. 
The educational process that could lead to such 
individual release would have to be implemented 
year by year. Progressive education of the type 
which allows the child freedom in specifying 
his own goal and to do this in sliding groups 
has shown manifest increases in both intellec-
tual and artistic powers. It appears to ease the 
more obvious social fetters upon the educational 
process and to encourage the spontaneity of the 
individual. These types of situations offer us 
the best opportunities to observe the various 
types of release, and the individual differen-
ces in the capacity of children to make use of 
one or another form of liberation. 
94 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of this theoretical venture is to 
attempt to use the perceptual act as a tropic 
field for analysis of states of non-adaptive be­
havior characterized by autistic syndromes. This 
study has been motivated by the assumption that 
a critical analysis of specific personality-in­
telligence configurations may reveal the nature 
of the balance between behavioral characteris­
tics and genetic perceptual and cognitive dis­
positions. To this end the syndromes of early 
infantile autism ала schizophrenic conditions 
are considered and explored for dispositional 
configurations. Further an attempt was made to 
relate certain manners of perceptual organiza­
tion to certain neural configurations. Also sup­
positions were advanced regarding the develop­
ment of genetic organizational dispositions to­
ward individual patterns of autistic perception. 
In this manner, the perceptual act was ultimate­
ly seen as an aspect of a series of acts in a 
perceptual-cognitive act of confronting, coping 
with, orientating and reacting in respect to the 
perceived world. 
Part I begins with an analysis of the literature 
on autistic syndromes in an attempt to present 
and integrate clinical and experimental concep­
tion of autism. Chapter I presents ana considers 
the variations in approach, study, and concep­
tions reached by the respective realms of cli­
nical and experimental psychology in their con­
sideration of autistic behavior. The major cha­
racteristics of the early infantile autism syn­
drome described by Kanner are presented and ana-
lized to determine the role of perception in 
this disturbance state. Chapter II involves an 
investigation into the balance of organism and 
environment, in terms of the normal progress 
and stages of development and with emphasis on 
the constitutional dispositions of the indivi­
dual and the influence of environmental factors 
upon them. Also the question is raised as to 
95 
what are the respective roles of hereditary, 
"biological and environmental factors in the for-
mation of autistic states. The psychogenic posi-
tion and organic and hereditary arguments are 
appraised as to the genesis of early infantile 
autism and to what light this may throw on other 
autistic states. Chapter III discusses the pro-
blems in differentiating some aspects of the 
autistic syndromes present in early infantile 
autism and childhood schizophrenia. It further 
presents the view that their respective unorien-
tated and disorientated positions may suggest a 
bipolar continuum of manners of association of 
stimuli with past experience based upon certain 
neuropsychic configurations. 
Part II presents the view that it may prove 
possible, through an analysis of the particular 
patterns and characteristics of intellectual, 
emotional and motivational behavior displayed 
by a group of individuals who show a specific 
personality configuration, to discern the nature 
of the adaptive approach implied in the genetic 
constitution of the individual, and through this 
to learn of their susceptibility to patterns of 
of autism. Chapter IV considers the molar phases 
of the perceptual act and their structuring ef-
fect upon the perceived world. The biological 
basis of perception is discussed and certain 
neural mechanisms are proposed as coordinators 
of sensory information and affect. The possible 
role of the reticular formation as the coordina-
tion of selective thought and site of the dis-
turbances found in early infantile autism and 
schizophrenia is presented and discussed. 
Chapter V presents a consideration of certain 
dispositional patterns of perceptual and cogni-
tive control which can be seen to define the 
manner of coordination between a class of adap-
tive intentions and a class of environmental si-
tuations. Suppositions were advanced as to what 
influence certain patterns or clusters of per-
ceptual and cognitive control might have on the 
ultimate course of developmental differentiation 
and integration and on the formation of particu-
96 
lar cognitive styles of adaption. This was done 
in an attempt to clarify what role various 
neuropsychic structures might play in forming 
individual variations in tendencies toward pat-
terns of autistic behavior. 
Part III involves itself with an appraisal of 
the preceding considerations in the light of 
what they might imply for behavior theory. 
Chapter YI attempts to present the view-that 
the individual organism is a complex region of 
more or less structuring in a field of complex 
and ever changing relations. Some of the nodal 
or anchorage points of the structuring sran be 
seen as dispositions toward not only organiza-
tion but a direction of development. The unique-
ness of an individual may be seen to lie not in 
his dispositional components but in their modes 
of interrelation. The world of the social scien-
ces has in many ways directed its attention to 
freeing maxi from plight or illiteracy according 
to average norms but has done comparatively 
little to free each individual for his own po-
tentiality. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Бе bedoeling van deze theoretische studie is te 
pogen de waarnemingsact te gebruiken als een 
analyse-veld van toestanden van niet-adaptief 
gedrag, gekarakteriseerd door autistibche syn­
dromen. 
Deze studie werd gemotiveerd door de veronder­
stelling dat een critische analyse van speci­
fieke persoonlijkheid-intelligentie configura­
ties de aard zou kunnen openbaren van de balans 
tussen gedragskarakteristieken en genetische 
waarnemings- en cognitieve disposities. 
Hiertoe werden de syndromen van vroeg-kinderlijk 
autisme en schizophrene condities beschouwd en 
onderzocht op dispoaitionele configuraties. 
Verder werd een poging gedaan om bepaalde wijzen 
van waarnemingsorganisatie te relateren aan be­
paalde neurale configuraties. Ook werden veron­
derstellingen naar voren gebracht betreffende 
de ontwikkeling van genetische organisatiedis­
posities tot individuele patronen van autis­
tische waarneming. Op deze wijze werd de waar­
nemingsact uiteindelijk gezien als een aspect 
van een serie acten in een waarnemings-cogni­
tief proces van confrontatie en omgaan met, van 
oriëntatie en reactie op de waargenomen wereld. 
Deel I begint met een analyse van de literatuur 
over autistische syndromen in een poging om de 
klinische en experimentele conceptie van autisme 
weer te geven en tot een geheel te verwerken. 
Hoofdstuk I geeft en beschouwt de variaties in 
benadering, studie en opvattingen, aangereikt 
door de respectievelijke gebieden van klinische 
en experimentele psychologie in hun beschouwing 
van autistisch gedrag. De voornaamste karakteri-
stieken van het vroeg-kinderlijk autisme-syn-
droom, beschreven door Kanner, worden weergege-
ven en geanalyseerd teneinde de rol te bepalen 
in deze gestoorde toestand. 
Hoofdstuk II houdt een onderzoek in naar de ba-
lans van organisme en omgeving, in termen van 
normale voortgang en ontwikkelingsstadia, met 
de nadruk op de constitutionele disposities van 
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het individu en de invloed van omgevingsfactoren 
hierop. Ook werd de vraag gesteld naar de res­
pectievelijke rollen van de erfelijkheids-, Ъіо-
logische- en omgevingsfactoren in het tot stand 
komen van autistische toestanden. Het psychogene 
standpunt en de organische- en erfelijkheids-ar-
gumenten worden gewaardeerd met betrekking tot 
de genese van vroeg-kinderlijk autisme en tot de 
vraag welk licht dit zou kunnen werpen op andere 
autistische toestanden. 
Hoofdstuk III bespreekt de problemen bij de dif­
ferentiatie van sommige aspecten van de autis­
tische syndromen, aanwezig in het vroeg-kinder­
lijk autisme en de schizophrénie in de kinderja-
ren. 
Verder brengt het het gezichtspunt naar voren 
dat hun respectievelijk ongeoriënteerde en ge-
desoriënteerde posities zouden kunnen suggereren 
een bipolair continuum van associatie-wijzen van 
stimuli met ervaringen in het verleden, geba-
seerd op bepaalde neuropsychische configuraties. 
Deel II brengt de opvatting naar voren dat het 
mogelijk zou kunnen zijn door een analyse van de 
bijzondere patronen en karakteristieken van ver-
standelijk, emotioneel en motivationeel gedrag, 
vertoond door een groep individuen die een spe-
-cifiek persoonlijkheidsbeeld laten zien, de aard 
te onderscheiden van de adaptieve benadering, 
geïmpliceerd in de genetische constitutie van 
het individu en hierdoor hun ontvankelijkheid te 
leren kennen voor patronen van autisme. 
Hoofdstuk IV beschouwt de onderscheiden phasen 
van de waarnemingsact en hun structureringsef-
fect op de waargenomen wereld. De biologische 
basis van de waarneming wordt besproken en be-
paalde neurale mechanismen worden voorgesteld 
als coördinatoren van de sensorische informatie 
en het affect. De mogelijke rol van de formatio 
reticularis, als de coördinator van selectief 
denken en zetel van de stoornissen, gevonden in 
vroeg-kinderlijk autisme en schizophrénie, wordt 
weergegeven en besproken. 
Hoofdstuk V geeft een beschouwing van bepaalde 
in aanleg aanwezig zijnde patronen van waarne-
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mings- en cognitieve controle die kunnen worden 
gezien als te Ъераіеп de wijze van ooördinatie 
bussen een groep van adaptieve bedoelingen en 
eer: groep van situaties in de omgeving. 
Veronderstellingen worden naar voren gebracht 
betreffende de invloed die bepaalde patronen 
van waarnemings- en cognitieve controle hebben 
op de uiteindelijke loop van de ontwikkelings-
differentiatie en integratie en op de tot stand-
koming van bijzondere cognitieve adaptieve stij-
len. 
Dit werd gedaan in een poging om de rol te ver-
helderen van de verschillende neuropsychische 
structuren bij de vorming van individuele va-
riaties in de tendenties naar patronen van au-
tistisch gedrag. 
Peel III houdt zich bezig met een waardering van 
de voorafgaande beschouwingen in het licht van 
wat zij zouden kunnen impliceren voor de ge-
dragstheorie. 
Hoofdstuk YI probeert de opvatting weer te geven 
dat het individuele organisme een complex gebied 
is van meerdere of mindere gestructureerdheid in 
een veld van complexe en steeds wisselende rela-
ties. 
Sommige van de verankeringspunten van de struc-
turering kunnen niet alleen beschouwd worden als 
disposities tot organisatie in de waarneming, 
maar ook als factoren die de richting aangeven 
in de ontwikkeling. Бе uniciteit van een indivi­
du zou gezien kunnen worden als niet te liggen 
in zijn aanlegcomponenten, maar in hun wijze van 
interrelatie. 
De sociale wetenschappen hebben op vele wijzen 
hun aandacht gericht op het bevrijden van de 
mens van plagen en ontwetendheid naar een gemid­
delde norm, maar zij hebben vergelijkenderwijs 
weinig gedaan om ieder individu vrij te maken am 
sijn eigen mogelijkheden te ontplooien. 
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STELLINGEN 
In de embryonale stadia van de ontwikkeling van 
het organisme moet het verschijnen van ieder 
nieuw actie-potentieel worden gevolgd door de 
realisering van een effective inhibitie voor dat 
potentieel. 
De persoonlijke referentieschema's zijn niet 
slechts een aspect van en standaard voor alle 
ervaring, maar zij dragen bovendien bij tot de 
vorm en de inhoud van alle ervaring. 
De vorm van de typische schema's van het geheu-
gen van de volwassenen past niet langer meer of 
is niet langer ontvankelijk voor vroeg-kinder-
lijke ervaringen en is daarom niet in staat tot 
het vasthouden of in herinnering brengen van 
deze. 
De conflicten tussen het individu en de eisen 
der cultuur alsmede de normen van een gegeven 
cultuur bepalen voor een aanzienlijk deel wat 
individuen zich herinneren en wat zij vergeten. 
Ervaart niet ieder individu een situatie ver-
schillend door het selecteren van bepaalde as-
pecten daaruit en het blind blijven voor andere 
en het aanbrengen van zijn eigen persoonlijke 
organisatie hierin. 
Onze menselijke situatie leren kennen vraagt 
dat onze studie van de situaties die invloed 
uitoefenen op de persoon even systematisch moet 
zijn als onze parallel-studie van de interne 
structuren die beantwoorden aan deze situaties. 
De levensontwikkeling van een individu is af-
hankelijk van de realisering van een bevrijding 
van zijn mogelijkheden via interactie met de om-
geving die op deze inwerkt. 
Cognitieve controles zijn in wezen de middelen 
van het individu tot het ordenen van de eigen-
schappen, relaties en beperkingen van gebeurte-
nissen en objecten op een zodanige wijze dat 
zij een adaptief-adequate oplossing bieden voor 
zijn bedoelingen die hem in contact brachten 
met de realiteit. 
Het niveau van de betekenis van het gedrag zal 
afhangen van het niveau van de waarnemingsdif-
ferentiatie en zal het niveau van het zintuige-
lijk waarnemen structureren. 
De uitgangspmten van de ontwikkelingsdifferen-
tiatie zullen berusten op de toniciteit van de 
persoonlijke genetische disposities tot de 
breedte van de stimuli-aequivalentie en het ni-
veau van emotionele interactie met de omgeving. 


